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GRAY-MARKET IMPORTS: CAUSES, 
CONSEQUENCES AND RESPONSES 
MICHAEL S. KNOLL* 
This article explores the issu.e of gray-market imports. The author 
explains the four causes of gray-market imports and explores the 
possibility of private remedies in order to stem the flow of these 
imports. The article then turns to the possibility of protection in 
the public sector by discussing pertinent statutory provisions and 
the development of the case law in this area. 
A PERSPECTIVE ON GRAY-MARKET IMPORTS 
In recent years, there has been dramatic growth in the size of 
the gray market, otherwise referred to as the parallel-import 
market. 1 This growth, contemporaneous with a strong rise in the 
• (A.B., 1977, A.M., 1980, Ph.D., 1983, J.D., 1984, The University of Chicago) 
Legal Advisor to the Vice Chairman, United States International Trade Commission. 
I would like to thank my colleagues at the International Trade Commission, especially 
Anne Brunsdale, Richard Boltuck, Lloyd Cohen, Richard Dagen, Susan Liebeler, and 
William Perry, for their many helpful comments and suggestions. I have also benefited 
from the research assistance of Georgia Cost and from having had the opportunity to 
present my views on gray-market imports at the Second Annual Judicial Conference 
of the United States Court of International Trade and the Antitrust Division of the 
Department of Justice. I would also like to thank the editors and staff at Law & Policy 
in International Business for all of their work. The views expressed in this paper are solely 
those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the International 
Trade Commission or any of its members. 
1. According to one estimate, sales of gray-market goods totalled $6 billion in 
1984. Boyer, The Assault on the Right to Buy Cheap Imports, FoRTUNE, Jan. 7, 1985, at 
89. The watch and camera industries have claimed to be especially hard hit. It has 
been estimated that nearly 20 percent of the reflex cameras sold in the United States 
in 1984 were sold through the gray market. PHOTOGRAPHIC TRADE NEws, Mar. 5, 1984, 
at 14. Similarly, Seiko claims that one out of four Seiko watches sold in the United 
States are sold on the gray market, which would imply that as much as $100 million in 
sales are diverted annually away from authorized Seiko dealers by gray market imports. 
Seiko's Battle Against the Grey Market, MoDERN jEWELER, Oct. 1983, at 44. Data on the 
growth of the gray market are much harder to obtain than are estimates of its size. The 
Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks (CO PIA T) conducted a 
survey of its members and compared estimates of their sales lost to diversion with their 
United States sales in 1982 and 1983 for products that are affected by gray-market 
imports. According to COPIAT, the ratio of lost sales to annual sales rose from 13.6 
percent _in 1982 to 17.3 percent in 1983. During this same period the sales of COPIAT 
companies' products subject to diversion rose by seven percent, while sales lost to 
diversion rose by 36 percent. CoLLADO AssociATES, INc., THE EcoNOMIC IMPACT OF 
DIVERSION 36~37 (1984) [hereinafter CoLLADo Assoc.). 
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dollar relative to most other major currencies, 2 has produced a 
flood of litigation.=1 The gray market consists of imports of genuine 
trademarked goods4 that the U.S. trademark owner has authorized 
for sale abroad but not for sale in the United States, and that 
compete in the same market with genuine goods the trademark 
owner has authorized for sale in the United States. Thus, gray-
market goods are not counterfeit goods, 5 but they are goods that 
the U.S. trademark owner has not approved for sale in the United 
States. Gray-market imports tend to be brands with reputations 
for high quality, 6 and include a wide range of products, including 
MAMIY A cameras, SEIKO watches, YvEs ST. LAURENT perfume, 
2. LEXECON INc., THE EcoNOMICS Of GRAY-MARKET IMPORTS 57-69 (1985) (here-
inafter LEXECON INC. J. An increase in the value of the dollar relative to currencies of 
other nations increases the relative value of investments made in the United States, 
such as the value of U.S. distributors' investments in marketing, warranty programs, 
and product quality. The result is increased incentives for importation of gray-market 
goods that take a free ride on U.S. marketing investments or that are inferior to the 
U.S. trademarked goods. /d. at 63-64. See also Assault on the Right to Buy Cheap Imports, 
FoRTUNE, Jan. 7, 1985, at 89 (rising dollar has led to an increase in gray-market 
imports); but see Dollar's Drop Drubs Gray Marketeers, Wash. Post, May 4, 1986, at 
F3, col. 4 (declining dollar has significantly reduced gray-market imports). U.S. 
exchange rates with several major trading partners are printed in the EcoNOMIC REPORT 
Of THE PRESIDENT 373 (1986) (Table 8-105). 
3. See, e.g., Olympus Corp. v. United States, 627 F. Supp. 911 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), 
alf'd, 792 F.2d 315 (2d Cir. 1986); Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American 
Trademarks v. U.S., 598 F. Supp. 844 (D.D.C. 1984), rev'd, 790 F.2d 903 (D.C. Cir. 
1986) (hereinafter COP/AT); Vivitar Co. v. United States, 593 F. Supp. 420 (Ct. Int'l 
Trade 1984), alf'd, 761 F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 
589 F. Supp. 1163 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Bell & Howell: Mamiya Co. v. Masel Supply 
Co., 548 F. Supp. 1063 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), vacated, 719 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1983) (here-
inafter Bell & Howell); Model Rectifier Corp. v. Takchiho Int'l, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 
502 (9th Cir. 1983); Certain Alkaline Batteries, 49 Fed. Reg. 45,275 (lnt'l Trade 
Comm. 1984), USITC Pub. 1616, lnv. No. 337-TA-165, (Nov. 1984) (hereinafter 
Durace/1). 
4. Alternate terms for unauthorized trademarked goods include gray-market, par-
allel, or diverted goods. 
5. The gray-market issue is similar to the issue of counterfeit merchandise. Unlike 
counterfeit goods, which are produced by an unauthorized party and bear an unau-
thorized trademark that is identical to the U.S. trademark, gray-market goods are 
genuine goods that are stamped with the U.S. trademark with the permission of the 
domestic trademark owner. For a discussion of the counterfeit goods issue, see The 
Effect of Foreign Product Counterfeiting on U.S. Industry, USITC Pub. 1479, lnv. No. 332-
158 (Jan. 1984). 
6. See Dam, Trademarks, Price Discrimination, and the Bureau of Customs, 7 J.L. & 
EcoN. 48 (1964). 
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MERCEDES-BENZ automobiles, DoM PERIGNON champagne, BAc-
CARAT crystal, and DuRACELL batteriesJ 
Gray-market merchandise enters the United States through 
independent importers who purchase the goods abroad from either 
wholesalers or retailers after the goods have left the control of the 
manufacturer. 8 The importers then ship these goods to the United 
States, where they are sold to retailers for resale to the public. 9 
Gray-market imports typically arise when the U.S. price for a 
brand is higher than the foreign price by a large enough amount 
that the importer can both cover the cost of importing the brand 
into the United States and earn a reasonable return. 10 Gray-
market imports occur in three distinct situations: 
1. Goods produced in the United States for export, which are 
then imported back into the United States without the authori-
zation of the U.S. trademark owner;'' 
2. Unauthorized imports competing with domestically produced 
goods;' 2 and 
3. Unauthorized imports competing with authorized imports.':' 
7. Auerbach, The Gray Market: Where a 1200 Watch Can Be Bought For 1140, Wash. 
Post, Dec. 16, 1984, at L1, col. I. According to COPIAT, many other industries are 
suffering from gray-market imports. These include apparel, boats, china, cosmetics, 
crystal, electronic equipment, food, pharmaceuticals, semiconductors, tires, and toys. 
CoLLADO Assoc., supra note 1, at 39-40. 
8. Gray-market merchandise also enters the United States through foreign whole-
salers that sell to domestic retailers. Su LEXECON INc., supra note 2, at 41143. 
9. Gray-market merchandise is usually, but not always, sold at a lower price than 
the authorized product. See Auerbach, supra note 7, at L3, col. I. 
10. But see LEXECON INc., supra note 2, at 26-30. 
11. In the Duracell investigation by the U.S. International Trade Commission, there 
was an allegation that some batteries were exported from the United States and then 
re-imported. See Duracell, supra note 3. 
12. Duracell involved the importation into the United States of batteries produced 
by a Belgian subsidiary of the U.S. parent for sale in Europe, which competed with 
the identical batteries produced in the United States by an unincorporatctf division of 
the same parent. Id. at 5-6. 
13. Of the three situations listed above, this one has generated the most litigation, 
and is probably the situation under which a majority of gray-market goods enter the 
United States. For example, both the Bell & Howell and the Osawa cases involved the 
unauthorized importation of photographic equipment, produced abroad and intended 
for sale abroad, into the United States in competition with photographic equipment 
produced abroad and imported into the United States through authorized channels. 
See, e.g., Bell & Howell: Mamiya Co. v. Masel Supply Co., 548 F. Supp. 1063, 1066 
(E.D.N.Y. 1982); Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 89 F. Supp. 1163, 1164 (S.D.N.Y. 
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The Genuine Goods Exclusion Act, originally enacted as section 
526 of the Tariff Act of 1922, permits the owner of a registered 
U.S. trademark to exclude genuine goods produced abroad that 
bear an identical trademark by recording its trademark with the 
U.S. Customs Service (Customs). 14 The Department of the Treasury 
1984). This situation is probably the most common because the gray-market goods 
travel only as far as the authorized goods. In contrast, when the goods are produced 
in the United States, exported to Europe, and then reimported by independent im-
porters, the gray-market goods must cross the Atlantic twice, whereas the authorized 
goods can go directly from the U.S. plant to the U.S. consumer. 
14. 19 U.S.C. § 1526 (1982). This section reads: 
148 
(a) Except as provided in subsection (d) of this section, it shall be unlawful 
to import into the United States any merchandise of foreign manufacture if 
such merchandise, or the label, sign, print, package, wrapper, or receptacle, 
bears a trademark owned by a citizen of, or by a corporation or association 
created or organized within, the United States, and registered in the Patent 
and Trademark Office by a person domiciled in the United States, under the 
provisions of sections 81 to 109 of Title 15, and if a copy of the certificate of 
registration of such trademark is filed with the Secretary of the Treasury, in 
the manner provided in section 106 of said Title 15, unless written consent 
of the owner of such trademark is produced at the time of making entry. 
(b) Any such merchandise imported into the United States in violation of 
the provisions of this section shall be subject to. seizure and forfeiture for 
violation of the customs laws. 
(c) Any person dealing in any such merchandise may be enjoined from 
dealing therein within the United States or may be required to export or 
destroy such merchandise or to remove or obliterate such trademark and shall 
be liable for the same damages and profits provided for wrongful use of a 
trademark, under the provisions of sections 91 to 109 of Title 15. 
(d)( 1) The trademark provisions of this section and section 1124 of Title 
15, do not apply to the importation of articles accompanying any person 
arriving in the United States when such articles are for his personal use and 
not for sale if (A) such articles are within the limits of types and quantities 
determined by the Secretary pursuant to paragraph (2) of this subsection, and 
(B) such person has not been granted an exemption under this subsection 
within thirty days immediately preceding his arrival. 
(2) The Secretary shall determine and publish in the Federal Register lists 
of the types of articles and the quantities of each which shall be entitled to 
the exemption provided by this subsection. In determining such quantities of 
particular types of trade-marked articles, the Secretary shall give such consid-
eration as he deems necessary to the numbers of such articles usually purchased 
at retail for personal use. 
(3) If any article which has been exempted from the restrictions of impor-
tation of the trade-mark laws under this subsection is sold within one year 
after the date of importation, such article, or its value (to be recovered from 
[Vol. 18:145 
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(Treasury), however, has promulgated regulations denying U.S. 
trademark owners the right to compel Customs to exclude genu-
ine trademarked goods produced abroad when the owner of the 
foreign trademark is related to the U.S. trademark owner of 
has applied the trademark with the authorization of the U.S. 
trademark owner. 15 In accordance with these regulations, Customs 
the importer), is subject to forfeiture. A sale pursuant to a judicial order or 
in liquidation of the estate of a decedent is not subject to the provisions of 
this paragraph. 
(4) The Secretary may prescribe such rules and regulations as may be 
necessary to carry out the provisions of this subsection 
19 U.S.C. § 1526 (1982) (Subsection (e) omitted). 
15. 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(b), (c) (1985). Section 133.21 reads: 
(a) Copying or simulating marks or names. Articles of foreign or domestic 
manufacture bearing a mark or name copying or simulating a recorded 
trademark or trade name shall be denied entry and are subject to forfeiture 
as prohibited importations. A "copying or simulating" mark or name is an 
actual counterfeit of the recorded mark or name or is one which so resembles 
it as to be likely to cause the public to associate the copying or simulating 
mark with the recorded mark or name. 
(b) Identical trademark. Foreign-made articles bearing a trademark identical 
with one owned and recorded by a citizen of the United States or a corporation 
or association created or organized within the United States are subject to 
seizure and forfeiture as prohibited importations. 
(c) Restrictions not applicable. The restrictions set forth in paragraphs (a) and 
(b) of this section do not apply to imported articles when: 
(1) Both the foreign and the U.S. trademark of trade name are owned 
by the same person or business entity; 
(2) The foregin and domestic trademark or trade name owners are parent 
and subsidiary companies or are otherwise subject to common ownership or 
control (see§§ 133.2(d) and 133.12(d)); 
(3) The articles of foreign manufacture bear a recorded trademark or trade 
name applied under authorization of the U.S. owner; 
(4) The objectional mark is removed or obliterated prior to importation in 
such a manner as to be illegible and incapable of being reconstituted, for 
example by: 
(i) Grinding off imprinted trademarks wherever they appear; 
(ii) Removing and disposing of plates bearing a trademark or trade name; 
( 5) The merchandise is imported by the recordant of the trademark or trade 
name or his designate; 
(6) The recordant gives written consent to an importation of articles other-
wise subject to the restrictions set forth in paragraphs (a) and (b) of this sec-
tion, and such consent is furnished to appropriate Customs officals; or 
(7) The articles of foreign manufacture bear a recorded trademark and the 
1986) 149 
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does not prevent most gray-market merchandise from entering 
the United States. 
The fundamental issue is: what should be the policy of the 
United States toward gray-market imports. 16 Because many people 
are reluctant to permit the government to enforce trade restric-
tions, 17 a showing that gray-market imports harm U.S. trademark 
owners is not sufficient to justify a restriction on gray-market 
imports. Thus, this paper deals with the two propositions that 
must be established to justify any governmental restriction on 
gray-market imports: that gray-market merchandise injures the 
economy as a whole, and that U.S. trademark owners are incap-
able of preventing the harm from gray-market imports, or may 
do so only at a much greater cost than the federal government 
can. 
Before making the argument that the government should restrict 
gray-market imports, the first section addresses the traditional 
argument for allowing gray-market imports into the United States, 
and reveals that it is based on an erroneous view of trademarks 
and restrictive distribution arrangements. The second section dis-
cusses the economic causes and consequences of gray-market 
imports. It begins with a general discussion of trademarks, and 
then addresses the four causes of gray-market imports: free riding 
on the trademark owner's goodwill, free riding on services, the 
importation of inferior-quality goods, and arbitraging interna-
tional price differences. Gray-market imports that result from the 
first three causes harm the economy because they reduce both the 
number and quality of goods introduced into the U.S. market 
and because they reduce the incentives for U.S. and foreign firms 
to develop export markets. Only gray-market imports that result 
from arbitrage are beneficial to the economy. In this section, this 
personal exemption is claimed and allowed under § 148.55 of this chapter. 
19 C.F.R. § 133.21 (1985) (Subsection (d) omitted). 
16. The federal government has been studying the matter for several years. See 
Treasury, OMB Seen Backing Some Restrictions on 'Grey Market' Imports, 3 Inside 
U.S. Trade (Inside Washington), at 9 (Apr. 26, !985); Solicitation of Economic Data 
Notice, 49 Fed. Reg. 21,453-56 (1984); Solicitation of Public Comment Notice, 51 
Fed. Reg. 22,005-07 (1986). 
17. The possibilities for abuse when governments interfere in international trade 
have been well documented over the last 210 years. Sa gentrally, A. SMITH, THE WEALTH 
OF NATIONS (Book IV, chapters II & III) ( 1776). 
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paper argues that arbitrage is probably only a minor cause of 
gray-market imports, and that gray-market imports are injurious 
to the economy as a whole, thus satisfying the first proposition 
required to justify a restriction on gray-market imports. The third 
section discusses the high cost of private remedies and the effi-
ciency of a number of proposed public remedies. It demonstrates 
that only a ban on gray-market goods enforced by the federal 
government can deal with the problem effectively, thus satisfying 
the second proposition required to justify government interven-
tion. The fourth section reviews the law on gray-market imports, 
and finds a strong basis there for excluding gray-market imports. 
It also--finds that Customs' regulations should be struck down as 
an unreasonable interpretation of section 526 and an improper 
exercise of Customs' enforcement discretion. Finally, the fifth 
section presents the conclusions. 
The Traditional View of Gray Markets 
Gray markets are frequently applauded on antitrust grounds. 111 
Proponents of the gray market begin by noting that the incentive 
for transshipping arises because the trademark owner charges a 
higher price in the domestic market than in the foreign market. 
According to this view of gray-market merchandise, arbitrage 
allows importers to break down the barriers that separate the two 
markets. 19 Thus, supporters of the gray market argue that pre-
venting the importation of gray-market goods would construct a 
barrier between the two markets, allowing the trademark owner 
to engage in monopolistic price discrimination. 20 In its simplest 
form, this argument is based on an incorrect view of trademarks, 
18. Su, e.g., Dam, supra note 6, at 57; The Assault on the Right to Buy Cheap Imports, 
supra note I, at 89 (William Niskanen, a senior member of the Council of Economic 
Advisors, has said, "I just don't understand why in the world the U.S. government 
should become an instrument for enforcing price discrimination between U.S. and 
foreign markets."). 
19. Even if a trademark owner has market power, the net welfare effect of allowing 
the monopolist to price discriminate is uncertain. See F. ScHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET 
STRUCTURE AND EcONOMIC PERFORMANCE 320-22 (2d ed. 1980). Here, however, there 
would be a reason to prevent monopoly price discrimination because gray-market 
imports will enter the United States only when the U.S. price is higher than the foreign 
price. Thus, U.S. consumers would be hurt by price discrimination that benefited the 
foreign supplier and foreign consumers. 
20. S~e Dam, supra note 6, at 45. 
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one that assumes that any price differences result from monopoly 
power conferred by the trademark and not from the local goodwill 
embodied in the trademark. 
Some supporters of the gray market develop the following 
argument: in order for a manufacturer to engage in monopolistic 
price discrimination, the manufacturer must have market power; 11 
the trademark provides the market power;12 therefore, because 
the owner of a trademark has the exclusive right to use that 
trademark on goods in commerce, 2:1 the trademark owner has a 
monopoly. For example, only Seiko can sell SEIKO watches and 
thus Seiko monopolizes SEIKO watches. Consequently, by allowing 
the owner of the trademark to separate the two markets, a ban 
on gray-market merchandise prevents buyers in the high-priced 
territory from purchasing the same merchandise either directly 
from sellers in the low-priced territory or from buyers in the low-
priced territory who bought the merchandise intending to resell 
it. Because arbitrage is prevented, the trademark owner can 
charge different prices in the separate markets. Thus, a ban on 
gray-market imports would allow the trademark owner to engage 
in monopolistic price discrimination. 14 
The fallacy of this argument is that a trademark does not confer 
market power on its owner. 25 The owner of a trademark, unlike 
the owner of a patent, cannot prevent potential competitors from 
making the same or a similar product. As long as a competitor 
does not affix a confusingly similar trademark to its merchandise, 
it can manufacture and promote the same or a similar product. 
Thus, any alleged failure to enter the market is an indication not 
of the trademark owner's monopoly power, but of market com-
petition. Unless there are barriers to entry,26 an entrepeneur would 
21. See j. HIRSHLEIFER, PRICE THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 350-52 (2d ed. 1980). 
22. For an economic argument that a trademark is a source of monopoly power, 
see E. CHAMBERLAIN, THE THEORY OF MoNOPOLISTIC CoMPETITION 61-64 (1962). 
23. IS U.S.C. § 1114 (1982). 
24. See Dam, supra note 6, at 48. 
25. For an economic argument why a good reputation would not confer market 
power on its owner or serve as a barrier to entry, see generally Shapiro, Premiums for 
High Quality Products as Returns to Reputations, 98 Q.J. EcoN. 659, 678 (1983). 
26. A barrier to entry is a condition that makes the costs of entry higher for new 
firms than for existing firms. G. STIGLER, ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 67 ( 1968). Barriers 
to entry improve the chances that the firms already in the market will be able to charge 
monopoly prices. See R. PoSNER, ANTITRUST LAw: AN EcoNOMIC PERSPECTIVE 48-50 
(1976). 
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enter the market if the expected return from promoting a new 
trademark justified the investment. 27 Thus, the absence of new 
trademarks indicates the consumers' unwillingness to pay the trade-
marked items' promotional cost. 28 Therefore, since trademarks are 
not legally created monopolies, it would be inappropriate to con-
clude that gray-market imports are always the result of monopolistic 
price discrimination. 29 
United States v. Guerlain, Inc. 30 illustrates the erroneous view, as 
applied to the gray market, that trademarks are legally created 
monopolies, which give their owners the opportunity to earn 
monopoly profits. In Guerlain, the Department of Justice charged 
each of the three defendants, Guerlain, Parfums Corday, and 
Lanvin Parfums, with attempting to monopolize and monopoliz-
27. Although the problem of monopolistic price discrimination is probably minimal 
in the context of gray-market goods, there might be some cases in which it occurs. In 
order to prevent market segmentation in these cases, it might be desirable to establish 
a procedure that would deny a trademark owner the right to exclude genuine mer-
chandise from entry into the United States, if it could first be shown by the Antitrust 
Division of the Department of Justice that the trademark owner was engaging in 
monopolistic price discrimination. The burden on the party seeking to deny the 
trademark owner the right to exclude should be heavy because the probability of 
monopolistic price discrimination is small. 
28. See R. CRASWELL, TRADEMARKS, CoNSUMER INFORMATION, AND BARRIERS TO 
CoMPETITION 21-23 (1979) (Federal Trade Commission Policy Planning Issues Paper). 
For a discussion of the relationship among trademarks, advertising, and competition, 
see F. ScHERER, supra note 19, at ch. 14. 
29. A related argument posits the requisite market power in product differentiation. 
For a discussion of the relationship between product differentiation and market power, 
see F. ScHERER, supra note 19, at ch. 14. This argument first recognizes that gray-
market goods are not fungible goods, but rather are differentiated brands of goods. 
The argument maintains that market power exists because of the trademark, product 
differentiation, and consumer preferences across brands. The flaw in this argument is 
that consumer preferences cannot give the manufacturer of a brand the market power 
to charge persistently anticompetitive prices in the U.S. market. Brand loyalty might 
explain short-run market power, but if advertising can create brand loyalty and thereby 
somewhat insulate a manufacturer from competition, all products would be heavily 
advertised. See R. PosNER, supra note 26, at 92-93. Gray-market imports would then 
affect all brands within a class, and not only those with the best reputations. Arguments 
have also been made. that a first-mover, that is, the first firm in an industry, has a 
competitive advantage. See F. ScHERER, supra note 19, at 260, 384, 427-28, 445-47; 0. 
WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS 34-
35 (1975). I am, however, unaware of evidence suggesting that gray-market imports 
affect the brands of first-movers more than those of later entrants. 
30. 155 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), vacated, 358 U.S. 915 (1958). 
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ing the importation into and sale within the United States of 
trademarked perfumes, in violation of the Sherman Act.:11 The 
Guerlain defendants were all U.S. corporations with a close asso-
ciation to the French company that had originated the trademark 
and first marketed the goods.:l2 In each case, the French company 
gave its associated U.S. company exclusive distribution rights for 
the U.S. market, and transferred to the U.S. company its trade-
mark rights. In accordance with section 526, each of the defend-
ants filed their trademarks with the Bureau of Customs to prevent 
the unauthorized importation of products bearing those trade-
marks.:l:l The government contended that such a use of section 
526 constituted a violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act.:l4 
According to the Guerlain court, a charge of illegal monopoli-
zation required a finding of both monopoly power and intent to 
monopolize. :Js The court reasoned that because a quality perfume 
could not sell without a famous name, the availability of the 
identical perfume without a recognized and respected trademark 
would have a negligible effect on the well-known brand. :16 There-
fore, the court found that each o( the defendants had monopoly 
power over the market consisting of its own trademarked product. 
Judge Edelstein made this finding, even though he noted that 
''about 90 different manufacturers sell over 408 perfumes of 
different names in the United States and of these manufacturers, 
61 sell toilet goods in the same price range as the toilet goods 
sold by defendants. ":17 Judge Edelstein also noted that of all the 
perfume sold in the defendants' price range, the CoRDAY brands 
combined accounted for 1. 7 percent of the market, the GuERLAIN 
brands for 2.9 percent and the LANVIN brands for 5 percent.:1" 
Monopoly power, which is the ability to maintain price substan-
31. /d. at 79. 
32. /d. 
33. /d. 
34. Section 2 of the Sherman Act reads in pertinent part as follows: "Every person 
who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any 
other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the 
several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony . . . . '' 15 
u.s.c. § 2 (1982). 
35. Guerlain, 155 F. Supp. at 83. 
36. ld. at 84-85. 
37. /d. at 84 n.22. 
38. See id. at 88-98. 
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tially above the competitive level, requires more than a miniscule 
market share.:19 Based on the facts in Guerlain, it cannot be denied 
that each brand competed against other well-known brands and, 
therefore, that none of the defendants had monopoly power. 40 
Thus, although a quality perfume needs a well-known name to 
succeed in the market, the existence of a trademark is not a source 
of monopoly power. Consequently, the gray-market imports were 
not a response to monopoly pricing of perfume in the United 
States. 
Furthermore, the current jurisprudence on vertical restraints 
suggests that a ban on the importation of gray-market goods 
would not be anticompetitive. Although granting a U.S. trade-
mark owner the right to exclude the genuine articles that bear 
the owner's trademark would restrain trade, such a restraint would 
effectively amount to a vertical, non price restraint. 41 Since 1977, 
the U.S. Supreme Court's approach to vertical, nonprice re-
straints has been to examine them under a rule of reason.}~ 
39. SeeR. PosNER, ANTITRUST LAw: AN EcoNOMIC PERSPECTIVE 102 (1976). 
40. See Lavey, Patenis, copyrights, and trademarks as sources of market power in anti-
trust cases, 27 ANTITRUST BuLL 433, 434-35 (1982) (to determine whether the owners 
of a trademark has an economic monopoly a court should look beyond the exclusive 
legal right, define the relevant market and measure its competitiveness). The differen-
tiated pricing of perfume in the United States and France reflects the greater retail suc-
cess of some perfumes in one country or the other. See LExECON INc., supra note 2, at 54-55. 
41. Private restraints on trade are classified as vertical or horizontal and as price 
or nonprice. A vertical restraint is a restriction agreed to by parties on different levels 
of the distribution stream, such as an agreement between a manufacturer and a retailer. 
A horizontal restraint is a restriction agreed to by parties at the same level of the 
distribution stream, such as an agreement between two manufacturers of the same 
product. A price restraint is a restriction on selling prices, whereas a nonprice restraint 
is a restriction on some other aspect of the movement of goods. The restriction from 
enforcing section 526 would be vertical, as opposed to horizontal, because the trademark 
owner would be deciding how to distribute its product, rather than agreeing with one 
or more competitors on how they would divide the market. The restriction is also a 
nonprice restraint because it gives different entities the exclusive right to sell the goods 
in different countries. 
42. The Supreme Court adopted the rule-of-reason standard for vertical, nonprice 
restraints in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). Prior 
to the Court's decision in Sylvania, vertical, non price restraints had been held per se 
illegal. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967). For a discussion 
of vertical restraints following the Supreme Court's decision in Sylvania see Bork, Vertical 
Restraints: Schwinn Overruled, 1977 SuP. CT. REv. 171; Posner, The Rule of Reason and 
the Economic Approach: R1/ections on the Sylvania Decision, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1977). 
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Vertical restraints on competition are generally considered to be 
procompetitive, not anticompetitive, especially when there is sig-
nificant competition among different brands, because they allow 
competition in merchandise distribution. Vertical restraints do 
not restrict competition among competing brands.4:1 Therefore, it 
is unlikely that consumers would be injured by a ban on gray-
market imports through persistently higher prices because, if it 
were profitable to do so, either importers would import similar 
foreign products that do not bear trademarks identical to U.S. 
trademarks, or manufacturers would go abroad and produce items 
for export to the United States.44 
EcoNoMic CAusEs AND CoNSEQUENCES oF GRAY-MARKET 
IMPORTS 
The causes and consequences of gray-market imports are inti-
mately bound up with the role that trademarks play in the 
development and manufacture of goods and their subsequent 
promotion and sale in the United States. Therefore, in order to 
understand how gray-market imports impair the system of trade-
marks and injure the economy, it is necessary to understand how 
trademarks function. 
How Trademarks Function 
Trademarks are not a unique feature of the U.S. economy, but 
are a common feature of all developed economies, including the 
nonmarket economies. 4~' By allowing consumers to gather infor-
43. Several prominent commentators have suggested that exclusive distribution 
agreements should be held lawful in all cases. Bork, supra, note 42; Easterbrook, The 
Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEx. L. REv. 1 (1984); Liebeler, Interbrand "Cartels" Under GTE 
Slyvania, 30 UCLA L. REv. I (1982); Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of 
Restricted Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 U. CHI. L. REv. 6 (1981). All of their arguments 
should apply with as much force to the gray-market issue. 
44. The inquiry that restrictions that can be privately enforced are procompetitive, 
but restrictions that are enforced by governments are anticompetitive is a false one. 
The distinction should focus on the effect of the restriction on competition, rather than 
on the most appropriate means of enforcing the restriction. 
45. See J. McCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR CoMPETITION § 2:1 (1984) (the 
People's Republic of China has a system of compulsory trademark registration); F. 
ScHERER, supra note 19, at 378 (Soviet economic planners have found that requiring 
''consumer goods manufacturers to imprint their individual production marks on 
products helped guard against deteriorating quality standards"). 
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mation, trademarks provide the impetus for the introduction and 
maintenance of high-quality goods in the marketplace. Trade-
marks allow consumers to identify the products of one source and 
distinguish them from those of other sources. 46 When consumers 
can distinguish among different brands of the same product, 47 
they can collect information about the individual brands, rather 
than just about the general product. 48 This allows consumers to 
purchase the brands they like and avoid those they do not. 49 
Consumers who are pleased with a brand will pay more for it 
than they will pay for a brand of lower or less-certain quality. 50 
This premium, which is the return to the trademark owner for 
its investment, provides the manufacturer with the incentive to 
produce high-quality goods and to maintain their quality.''' The 
trademark owner's investment includes not only the cost of pro-
moting the product, but also the cost of producing and maintain-
ing a quality product.n With a distinctive trademark/':1 the 
46. Section 45 of the Lanham Act defines a trademark by its identifying function. 
A trademark is defined to include "any word, name, symbol, or device or any 
combination thereof adopted and used by a manufacturer or merchant to identify his 
goods and distinguish them from those manufactured or sold by others." 15 U .S.C. 
§ 1127 (1982). 
47. The term "brand" is used to refer to the products sold under a given trademark. 
48. R. CRASWELL, supra note 28, at 7. 
49. F. ScHERER, supra note 19, at 378 ("if there were no brand names and 
trademarks, the consumer might never be sure who made a product and would have 
difficulty rewarding through repeat purchases manufacturers who achieve high quality 
or cater to his or her special tastes"); Statement by William F. Baxter, before the 
Senate Committee on the judiciary concerning S. 2428 (Sept. 15, 1982), quoted in J. 
McCARTHY, supra note 45, at 44-45 ("[T]rademarks play a crucial role in our free 
market economic system. By identifying the source of goods or services, marks help 
consumers to identify their expected quality and, hence, assist in identifying goods and 
services that meet the individual consumer's expectations .... "); A. MILLER & M. 
DAVIS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN A NUTSHELL 147 (1983) ("[T)oday, trademark Jaw 
allows a buyer to assert a preference in his or her purchasing .... "); J. GILSON, 
TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE § 1.03[3) (1985) ("[T)o consumers, trademarks 
play a vital role. They permit the selection of products or services which are desired 
and the avoidance of those which are not .... "). 
50. Shapiro, supra note 25, at 659. 
51. J. McCARTHY, supra note 45, S 2:1 ("[T)rademarks fix responsibility. Without 
marks, a seller's mistakes would be untraceable to their source. Therefore, trademarks 
create an incentive to keep up a good reputation for a predictable quality of goods"); 
see Shapiro, supra note 25, at 660-61. 
52. These costs can be substantial; they include the costs of developing the product, 
providing warranty services, and promoting the product, including brand advertising. 
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trademark owner fully internalizes the benefits of any changes in 
the product's quality/'4 The capitalized value of the flow of future 
premiums is the goodwill associated with the trademark. In market 
equilibrium, the expected present value of the stream of premiums 
will just compensate the trademark owner for its investment."'' 
Because consumers recognize the trademark, the goodwill is as-
sociated with the trademark and not with the trademark owner. ''6 
If there were no trademarks, the goods available on the market 
would be of much lower quality.''7 Without trademarks, different 
brands of the same product would be indistinguishable. As a 
result, consumers would gather only general information about 
the product and would not be able to collect individual brand 
information. No producer, then, would get the entire benefit from 
its quality improvements. Similarly, a producer would be able to 
externalize the cost of reduced quality over all producers of the 
same product. Because consumers would not be able to distinguish 
one brand from another, their only basis for making a selection 
would be price. In order to compete for customers, therefore, 
producers would reduce quality in order to cut costs. Thus, 
Gray·market importers do not bear any of these costs, but they benefit from them. A 
COPIAT survey of its members found that on average its members spent an amount 
equal to 19.3 percent of their annual sales on brand advertising. This number is 
probably an upperbound since COPIAT is actively involved in the fight against gray-
market imports. CoLLADO Assoc., supra note 1, at 13. 
53. A distinctive trademark is a mark that distinguishes goods from one source 
from those of other sources. 
54. SeeR. CRASWELL, supra note 28, at 7. 
55. See Klein & Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance, 
89 J. PoL. EcoN. 615 (1981); Shapiro, supra note 25, at 659. 
56. J. McCARTHY, supra note 45, § 2:7; A. MILLER & M. DAVIS, supra note 49, 
§ 13.1. 
57. As J. Thomas McCarthy has observed: 
It cannot be blithely assumed that brands are unimportant because most 
branded goods on the market appear to be of a generally acceptable quality. 
Of course, goods of uniformly poor quality soon disappear from the market. 
A maker of a shoddy product can only fool some of the people some of the 
time. The generally high uniformity of quality that exists may itself be the 
result of the use of brands and trademarks. Only by observing a trademarkless 
environment could one see the importance of marks. 
J. McCARTHY, supra note 45, § 2: 1 (emphasis in original). 
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without trademarks, there would be a race to manufacture poorer-
quality goods. ''8 
The preceding two paragraphs present two discrete scenarios: 
a world with perfect trademarks in which producers have an 
incentive to produce high-quality goods, and a world without 
trademarks in which producers race to produce low-quality goods. 
The real world, however, represents an intermediate state of 
affairs in which trademark owners capture only some portion of 
the flow of premiums from the goodwill they have developed. 
Trademark law, especially the doctrine of trademark infringement, 
attempts to ensure that the trademark owner captures as much 
of the returns from its trademark's goodwill as possible. Gray-
market imports, however, divert some portion of the premiums 
from the trademark's goodwill, and thus interfere with the func-
tioning of the trademark system. 
The Free-Rider Problem 
Independent importers will find a market for gray-market goods 
in the United States when the U.S. price is sufficiently higher 
than the foreign price to make transshipping profitable.''9 There 
are four possible causes of persistent price differences, and thus 
of gray-market imports, three of which involve free riding. 6° Free 
riding occurs when benefits are enjoyed by individuals who can 
avoid paying for them. A classic example of free riding involves 
58. As Richard Craswell has observed: 
If there were no trademarks and consumers could learn only about the quality 
distribution of the industry as a whole, a manufacturer would gain little or 
nothing from improving his product's quality. Consumers would be unable 
to recognize high- or low-quality brands, so sales would tend to go to man-
ufacturers who reduced their price by cutting corners on quality. The result 
would be a race to produce inferior products, rather than competiton to 
produce better ones. 
R. CRASWELL, supra note 28, at 7. 
59. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text. 
60. Those who benefit from the services without incurring the costs are called free-
riders by economists. For a discussion of the free-rider problem, see J. HIRSH LEIFER, 
supra note 21, at 561-65. In the context of gray-market imports both arbitrage and 
free-riding involve shipping goods from a low-priced to a high-price territory. With 
free riding the price difference is a result of different levels of investment, whereas with 
arbitrage the price difference is a result of price discrimination. 
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national defense. Whereas all members of an alliance benefit from 
their mutual defense because any member's threat of retaliation 
reduces the threat of attack against each, each member is tempted 
to take a free ride on the efforts of the others by reducing its 
defense spending. Thus, unless there is an independent means of 
inducing the members to contribute, some will contribute less 
than their share, and less than the optimal amount of defense will 
be provided.61 The free-rider problem is central to an understand-
ing of the gray market. The trademark owner and the authorized 
dealers make the investments and provide the services that in-
crease the desirability of the brand, and from which importers, 
retailers, and purchasers of gray-market merchandise benefit, but 
for which they do not pay. 
The First Cause of Gray-Market Imports: Free Riding on Reputation 
The first cause of gray-market imports is free riding on the 
U.S. trademark owner's reputation. By diverting sales away from 
the trademark owner's authorized distribution network to that of the 
unauthorized importers, gray-market importers appropriate some 
of the return from the trademark's goodwill. Each time the 
authorized distribution channel loses a sale to the unauthorized 
distribution channel, the trademark owner loses its premium for 
providing a product of high and consistent quality. The redirection 
of this premium is generally recognized by the law as unfair. 62 In 
addition, permitting a gray-market importer to take a free ride 
on the trademark owner's reputation reduces future trademark 
owners' incentives to provide quality products. 
A U.S. trademark is associated with a level of goodwill in the 
United States. This same trademark will also be associated with 
a level of goodwill in other countries where it is used. This 
goodwill is created by the trademark owner through a costly 
investment in product development, marketing and quality con-
trol.6:~ The trademark owner must also convince the public that 
it will maintain a constant level of quality. In addition, if the 
product is of high quality, and thus expensive to produce, it must 
convince consumers that it is worth its high price. Thus, the 
61. M. OLSON, THE Lomc OF CoLLECTIVE AcTION 1-52 (1971); Olson & Zeckhauser, 
An Economic Theory of Alliances, 48 REv. EcoN. & STAT. 267 (1966). 
62. See A. MILLER & M. DAVIS, supra note 49, at 180-183. 
63. See supra notes 50-55 and accompanying text. 
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goodwill associated with a trademark will depend on the amount 
of the investment and the effectiveness of that investment. There-
fore, there is no reason to expect the level of goodwill to be the 
same in two separate markets. 64 
The perfume market, for example, is highly competitive, and 
OPIUM by Yves St. Laurent accounts only for a small portion of 
that market; thus, any price difference for OPIUM between markets 
is likely to be the result of the size and effectiveness of the 
investments. OPIUM, which is manufactured in France, can be 
purchased retail in Paris and shipped to the United States for $69 
an ounce, including freight and customs. In the United States, 
the same perfume has a wholesale price of $96 an ounce and 
retails for $160 an ounce.65 When OPIUM is sold in the United 
64. In order for goodwill developed by the U.S. trademark owner to be the cause 
of gray-market imports, the United States must be a separate and distinct market. 
Market boundaries and national boundaries are not always coextensive, but they often 
are because the exchange of information and goods tends to occur more freely within 
a nation than between nations. Many nations have a single national language, and 
contiguous nations frequently have different languages. In addition, the media, whether 
it is print, radio, or television, is often limited by national boundaries. Furthermore, 
- there are a number of reasons why goods might not flow freely between two countries, 
thereby making the two countries separate markets. First, and most conspicuously, 
tariffs or quotas frequently hinder trade between two countries. Second, other nontariff 
barriers, such as emission and safety standards for automobiles or testing requirements 
for pharmaceuticals, can prevent the free flow of goods between nations. Third, the 
cost of transporting goods between two countries, which includes exchange rate risk 
and the cost of complying with Customs' regulations, tends to justify treating different 
nations as separate markets. Finally, countries have separate and different legal systems, 
especially antitrust laws, trademark laws and licensing requirements. See infra notes 135-
141 and accompanying text. All of these reasons would tend to cause trademarks to 
embody different amounts of goodwill in different countries. Treaties, international 
agreements, and the U.S. Supreme Court have recognized that an identical trademark 
can represent different amounts of goodwill in separate national markets. Paris Con-
vention for the Protection of Industrial Property, art. 6(3), Mar. 20, 1883, as revised 
July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, T.I.A.S. No. 6923 (entered into force Aug. 25, 1973, 
24 U.S.T. 2140, T.I.A.S. No. 7727). Article 6(3) of the Paris Convention, to which 
the United States is a signatory, provides that "[a) mark duly registered in a country 
of the Union, shall be regarded as independent of marks registered in the other countries 
of the Union, including the country of origin." /d. See Dernberg, Territorial Scope and 
Situs of Trademarlcs and Goodwill, 47 VA. L. REv. 733 (1961); Osawa & Co. v. B & H 
Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163, 1171 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). This principle-that trademarks are 
national, not universal-is called the principle of territoriality and in U.S. law is derived 
from Justice Holmes' opinion for the U.S. Supreme Court in A. Bourjois & Co. v. 
Katzel, 260 U.S. 689 (1922). 
65. The Gray Market: Where a 6200 Watch Can Be Bought for 1140, Wash. Post, Dec. 
16, 1984, at Ll, col. 1. 
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States, the authorized U.S. distributor, Charles of the Ritz, loses 
his premium from OPIUM's U.S. goodwill. 66 
The story is the same-only the magnitude changes-when the 
U.S. and foreign trademark owners are related. If Charles of the 
Ritz is independent of the French trademark owner, then Charles 
of the Ritz will lose its entire premium when a gray-market bottle 
of OPIUM is sold in the United States. If, however, Charles of 
the Ritz is part of Yves St. Laurent, then Yves St. Laurent still 
earns its French rather than its U.S. premium. In order for 
transshipping to be profitable to independent importers, however, 
the U.S. price must exceed the French price by more than the 
cost of shipping. Because both the authorized and unauthorized 
product must be shipped to the United States, there will be an 
incentive to transship when the U.S. premium is higher than the 
French premium. Therefore, even when the U.S. and foreign 
trademark owners are related, the combined owner of the U.S. 
and foreign trademarks will still lose part of its premium from 
gray-market imports. 
The gray-market importer gets a free ride because the trade-
mark owner makes the investment that creates the premium, 
whereas the gray-market importer captures the premium without 
making any investment.67 The trademarked good's premium is 
66. Charles of the Ritz's premium on OPIUM is the difference between its cost and 
the $96 wholesale price. 
67. A similar practice was condemned by the Supreme Court in the leading case 
on unfair competition, International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 
(1918), as both unfair and illegal. In that case, the International News Service (INS) 
was copying news gathered and prepared by the Associated Press (AP) from bulletin 
boards and early East Coast editions of papers subscribing to its service. INS argued, 
using the exhaustion doctrine, that once AP published the news it had collected it lost 
all rights to that news and could no longer prevent INS from using it. The Supreme 
Court, however, rejected INS's argument and enjoined it from taking the news from 
bulletin boards and early editions on the grounds of unfair competition. Justice Pitney 
characterized INS's behavior as follows: 
162 
In doing this defendant, by its very act, admits that it is taking material that 
has been acquired by complainant as the result of organization and the 
expenditure of labor, skill, and money, and which is salable by complainant 
for money, and that the defendant in appropriating it and selling it as its own 
is endeavoring to reap where it has not sown, and by disposing of it to 
newspapers that are competitors of complainant's members is appropriating 
to itself the harvest of those who have sown. Stripped of all disguises, the process 
amounts to an unauthorized interference with the normal operation of complainant's 
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the trademark owner's return on its investment promoting the 
trademark and developing and maintaining a high quality prod-
uct.68 Gray-market imports reduce the flow of premiums to the 
trademark owner.69 The redirection of such premiums is a cost 
to future trademark owners because the expected returns from 
investing in trademarks and trademarked merchandise will de-
cline. 
The current lax policy toward gray-market imports reduces a 
manufacturer's expected return from developing and promoting 
a product. A manufacturer deciding today whether to develop a 
new line of merchandise, therefore, will anticipate a diminished 
flow of future premiums if it expects gray-market importers to 
import its products. Such a manufacturer will probably respond 
by making a smaller investment in marketing, by producing a 
lower-quality product, or by withdrawing from research and de-
velopment. As a result, some products might never be introduced 
into the marketplace, whereas others will be introduced at a lower 
level of quality than they would otherwise be. Because both the 
premium and the opportunities for transshipping are greater the 
higher the product's quality, the possibility of gray-market imports 
reduces the expected return from providing a high-quality prod-
legitimate business precisely at the point where the prrifit is to be reaped, in order to divert 
a material portion rif the profit from those who haue earned it to those who have not; 
with special advantage to defendant in the competition because it is not burdened with 
a'!)' part of the expense of gathering the news. The transaction speaks for itself, and 
a court of equity ought not to hesitate long in characterizing· it as unfair 
competition in business. 
!d. at 239·40 (emphasis added). 
68. This is the economic concept of equilibrium. Economists call the premium a 
quasi-rent. See Klein & Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance, 
89 J. PoL. EcoN. 615, 626-29 (1981). 
69. The goodwill of a mark is often developed over a long period of time. It also 
depreciates, but only slowly, unless something occurs to sharply reduce the desirability 
of the brand in the estimation of consumers. Thus, the premium earned by a manu-
facturer today is likely to be the result of an investment made in the past. Consequently, 
a comparison of the investments currently being made by a trademark owner in different 
countries is not sufficient to determine whether there is the same amount of goodwill 
in the two countries. Furthermore, even if the investments were correctly compared, it 
is quite possible that a brand would have a better reputation in one country than in 
another. This could be because investments in goodwill are generally more effec-
tive in one country or because one investment just turned out to be better than the 
other. 
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uct more than it reduces the return from providing a low-quality 
product. Thus by redirecting the trademark owner's premium, 
gray-market imports will reduce the average quality of goods on 
the market. 711 
The Second Cause of Gray-Market Imports: Free Riding on Services 
The second cause of gray-market imports is free riding on 
services. National distributors, regional wholesalers, or local re-
tailers often provide services that increase the demand for their 
products. Those that provide these services, and incur the cost of 
doing so, can be taken advantage of by those that do not provide 
them, unless the former can exclude consumers who do not pur-
chase from them. If exclusion is not possible, a discounter can 
undercut the authorized dealers while benefiting from the services 
they provide. Such discounters are said to take a free ride on the 
services of the authorized dealer. In order to understand this cause 
of gray-market imports and how it injures the domestic economy, 
it is necessary to understand why trademark owners often restrict 
the distribution of their products. 71 
70. /d. There are two reasons to expect that permitting gray-market imports will 
lead to a reduction in the quality of goods in the market. First, goods that command 
a large premium in the United States are more likely to be sold elsewhere at a low 
enough price to justify the cost of transportation than are goods that command a small 
premium. Thus, permitting gray-market imports into the United States will reduce the 
potential gains from developing high-quality goods relative to the potential gains from 
producing low-quality goods. Second, gray-market imports, by reducing the trademark 
owner's premium, will reduce the trademark owner's incentive to maintain the quality 
of its brand, and may even induce the owner to intentionally debase the product. The 
trademark owner's premium is an important mechanism for assuring that the trademark 
owner maintains the quality of its product. If the price of a high-quality product just 
covers its cost of production, then producers of such goods could gain by cutting quality 
and earning a profit until consumers learned of the deception. The discounted flow of 
premiums these manufacturers earn, if high enough, can deter them from cutting 
quality because they will lose this flow if they cheat. Gray-market goods, which reduce 
the premium, lower the cost to the manufacturer of cheating, and thus make cheating 
more likely. See id. Thus, even genuine gray-market goods of the same quality as the 
authorized goods can induce manufacturers to reduce the quality of their already 
existing goods. See id. 
71. In recent years, the large and growing literature on restricted distribution 
agreements has had a significant impact on the judicial treatment of such agreements. 
For a recent overview of the arguments why manufacturers would impose vertical 
restraints, see T. OvERSTREET, RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE: EcoNOMIC THEORIES AND 
EMPIRICAL EviDENCE §§ II-IV (Bur. of Econ. Staff Report to the Fed. Trade Comm. 
1983). 
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A trademark owner benefits by having its product available in 
many outlets because it is easier for consumers to purchase the 
brand, which, in turn, increases sales. In addition, the greater 
the number of retail outlets that sell a given brand, the greater 
the competition among retailers. This competition reduces the 
dealer mark-up on the product, thereby increasing both the brand's 
overall sales and profits. Thus, if a trademark owner chooses to 
restrict the distribution of its brand, it must receive a benefit that 
it values more than increased retailer competition and ease of 
purchase. A trademark owner restricts distribution in order to 
induce its distributors and dealers to provide special services they 
would not otherwise provide. 72 
The classic argument for providing special services involves 
retailers. n A trademark owner that wants to market a product 
successfully must promote the brand. Furthermore, the desirability 
of many products increases when the seller provides services. Such 
services might include educating potential consumers about the 
product, repairing the product under warranty, or maintaining 
an inventory of accessories that can be used with the product. 
Many of these services can be provided more efficiently by the 
distributors and retailers than by the trademark owner. Competing 
retailers, however, have little incentive to market the brand or to 
provide special services because the actions undertaken and paid 
for by any one retailer will benefit many retailers. Since a retailer 
who makes such an invesment would not receive all of the benefits 
from its investment, the retailer lacks the incentive to make the 
investment, or at least to make as large an investment as the 
trademark owner would desire. 74 
A camera company, for example, might have found that its 
dealers market its camera more efficiently when they take the 
time to show potential customers how the camera works. 75 Indeed, 
if some retailers provided this service and others did not, rational 
consumers would go, first, to the retailers providing the service 
72. /d. 
73. Telser, Wiry Should Manufacturers Want Fa.ir Trade?, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 86 (1960). 
74. See T. OvERSTREET, supra note 71, at 49-51. 
75. Having retailers charge customers directly for this service will probably not be 
practical because consumers cannot gauge how valuable this service is to them before 
they buy it, and have no incentive to pay for it after they have consumed it. See id. at 
51 n.3. 
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in order to learn about the different brands, and then, to a 
discount house that did not provide the service to make their 
purchases. The full-service retailer would find that it was losing 
paying customers and that its usual mark-up did not cover the 
costs for the services provided. If it wanted to continue to provide 
the services, it would have to increase its mark-up, which would 
cause it to lose even more customers to discounters. In response, 
it would have to raise its mark-up even more. Such a retailer 
would eventually have to stop providing the services. The situation 
would be the same for all of the company's full-service reatailers. 
Eventually, the company would find that none of its retailers 
would be willing to provide the desired services. 7fj 
If the company wants services provided, it must protect the 
dealers that provide them from low-cost dealers that do not. One 
way of protecting dealers' margins would be through resale price 
maintenance (RPM), a policy by which the manufacturer sets a 
minimum retail price for its product. RPM allows a company to 
prevent its dealers from competing by cutting services and charg-
ing lower prices; that is, it allows the company to force dealers 
to compete through the provision of services. 
Although substantial academic opinion says that RPM should 
be legal, 77 it is still per se illegal. 78 Manufacturers, therefore, have 
turned to nonprice restraints to protect dealers' margins and to 
ensure the provision of special services. The most common tech-
niques used to induce the provision of services fall under the 
rubric "exclusive distribution. " 79 These techniques include exclu-
sive distributorships, authorized dealers, and location clauses. 
According to current antitrust law, these techniques are judged 
under a rule of reason, and will be upheld if reasonable."" 
76. See id. at 49. 
77. For a list of authorities, see id. at 13 n.l. 
78. See California Retail Liquors Dealers Association v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 
445 u.s. 97, 102 (1980). 
79. Vertical restraints can be used to protect dealer margins and the manufacturer 
can require the dealer provide special services. Gray-market goods, which enter the 
United States through unauthorized channels, can be sold at lower prices than their 
domestic counterparts, because the retailers of gray-market goods do not have to provide 
the special services. Instead, the gray-market retailer can allow the authorized dealer 
to provide pre-sale services and then sell the merchandise at a lower price. The additiol'lal 
markups that result from the special services provide one incentive for parties to import 
gray-market goods. This is especially true when the goods are imported from markets 
where these services are not provided. 
80. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). 
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Retailers of gray-market imports frequently get a free ride on 
the services provided by authorized distributors, wholesalers, and 
dealers. The retailer of gray-market merchandise does not have 
to provide any services, even though the distributor can legally 
induce all retailers into providing them. For example, because 
retailers of gray-market cameras do not have to maintain an 
inventory of accessories, the purchaser of a gray-market camera 
can buy his accessories from an authorized dealer that maintains 
a large stock. Free-riding retailers of gray-market merchandise 
get the benefit of these services without paying for them. 81 This 
reduces the returns to those in the authorized distribution chain, 
thereby making it more difficult for the manufacturer to require 
the provision of services. Thus, gray-market imports are likely to 
reduce the level of services provided to the consumer .112 
In addition to gray-market retailers getting a free ride on the 
services provided by U.S. retailers, gray-market importers get a 
free ride on the services provided by the U.S. distributor- trade-
mark owner. Some distributors provide services directly, either 
instead of or in addition to the services provided by their retail-
ers.11:~ While distributors pay for these services from the proceeds 
of their sales, retailers and consumers pay for these services 
through higher prices. Gray-market importers, however, do not 
pay for these services when they purchase goods abroad because 
the price of the goods abroad will not include the cost of the 
services provided by the U.S. trademark owner. 114 By taking sales 
81. One argument made by gray-market retailers is that they also advenise and 
provide services. See Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163, 1167 (S.D.N.Y. 
1984). This response misses the point. Although retailers of gray-market imports 
advertise, they do not advertise to promote the brand, but rather to publicize their low 
prices. /d. More generally, because they are beyond the reach of the trademark owner, 
they do not have to provide the same kind and level of services as the authorized 
dealers. Because the trademark owner can only induce its dealers to provide these 
services through the use of vertical restraints, it is very unlikely that retailers of gray-
market imports will voluntarily provide the same services. 
82. These services benefit consumers who in general value them at least as much 
as it costs retailers to provide them. SeeR. PosNER & F. EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST 213 
(2d ed. 1981). If consumers were not willing to pay for these services, then competition 
among manufacturers would lead to their elimination. 
83. These services include clinics and brand advertising. Osawa, 589 F. Supp. at 
1176. 
84. The gray-market importer may pay abroad for services that are not used. It 
cannot, however, be assumed that a related United States trademark owner is not 
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away from the authorized chain of distribution, gray-market im-
porters will. increase the cost to the U.S. distributor-trademark 
owner of providing services, which will most likely reduce the 
services provided. 
The Third Cause of Gray-Market Imports: Importation of Inferior-
Quality Goods 
The third and most damaging class of gray-market goods is 
inferior-quality gray-market merchandise. Inferior-quality goods 
not only redirect the premium away from the trademark owner, 
but also injure the trademark owner's goodwill, reducing the 
expected future stream of returns that flow from the trademark. 
When a consumer purchases.an inferior-quality item, his estimate 
of the brand's quality declines. 11 ~' This reduces the goodwill the 
trademark owner enjoys and, as a result, the premium the brand 
can command in the future. xh Inferior-quality gray-market goods 
arise in two forms: identically produced goods that become inferior 
to the authorized goods because of improper care during impor-
tation, and foreign goods of inherently different quality than the 
domestic goods. 
There is good reason to expect that gray-market importers will 
not take as much care as the trademark owner and authorized 
thereby injured, because the level of services might be greater in the United States. 
This is likely to be true because the gray-market importer will not import the product 
unless the U.S. price is sufficiently above the foreign price to justify the expense of 
transshipping. Alternatively, if the foreign distributor is the source of the gray-market 
goods, the price will not include the cost of foreign services. 
85. Su R. CRASWELL, supra note 28, at 7, and discussion, infra notes 92-99 and 
accompanying text. 
86. As Justice Holmes observed in Bourjois: 
Ownership of the goods does not carry· the right to sell them with a specific 
mark. It does not necessarily carry the right to sell them at all in a given 
place. If the goods were patented in the United States a dealer who lawfully 
bought similar goods abroad from one who had a right to make and sell them 
there could not sell them in the United States .... The monopoly in that 
case is more extensive, but we see no sufficient reason for holding that the 
monopoly of a trade mark, so far as it goes, is less complete. It deals with a 
delicate matter that may be of great value but that easily is destroyed, and that therifore 
should be protected with comrsponding care. 
Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 260 U.S. 689, 692 ( 1922) (emphasis added). 
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distributors. 87 Unlike the trademark owner that receives the ben-
efits of its quality control, as well as the losses from its shortcom-
ings, the gray-market importer does not receive all of the benefits 
from his quality control. If the gray-market importer takes ap-
propriate care, then the consumers who purchase the goods he 
imports will have a good opinion of the brand, and may even 
repurchase it. On the other hand, if the gray-market importer 
takes inadequate care, then the brand's reputation will suffer and 
there will be fewer repurchases. Because any one gray-market 
importer supplies only a small share of the market, he receives a 
small amount of the benefit from the brand's enhanced reputation 
if he takes appropriate care. On the other hand, since the gray-
market importer can easily turn his attention to importing other 
goods, he can avoid almost all of the costs of improper handling. 1111 
The gray-market importer, therefore, cannot internalize all of the 
benefits of proper handling, whereas he can externalize much of 
the costs of improper handling. 11!1 This is the free-rider problem 
once again.'10 Thus, it is reasonable to expect that gray-market 
goods will often receive inadequate care during importation. '11 
87. See Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163, 1172-73 (S.D.N.Y. 
1984). 
88. This is not to say that there are no market forces to encourage proper care. 
The gray-market importer has its own reputation to protect. The crucial point is not 
that the gray-market importer has no incentive to take care, but that its actions will 
affect the trademark owner's reputation and it does not have the same incentive that 
the trademark owner has to protect the goodwill of the trademark. 
89. See Adolph Coors Co. v. A. Genderson & Sons, Inc., 486 F. Supp. 131 (D. 
Colo. 1980), for an analogous situation in a purely domestic context. In Coors, a beer 
wholesaler made an unauthorized sale of trademarked beer without following strict 
quality control standards designed to maintain the quality of the product. The sale was 
held to constitute statutory and common-law trademark infringement, by damaging the 
manufacturer's reputation and diluting the distinctive quality of its trademark and 
tradename which served as a guarantee of the quality of the beer. See also Duracell, supra 
note 3, at 7-20; see generally Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. EcoN. 305 (1976); Fama, Agency Problems 
and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. PoL. EcoN. 288 ( 1980). 
90. The importer who sells inferior quality gray-market merchandise takes a free 
ride on the trademark owner's reputation. Thus, a gray-market importer of Dom 
Pcrignon champagne who does not take proper care of his cargo will still benefit from 
the care taken by the authorized importer because consumers cannot distinguish between 
authorized and unauthorized bottles. 
91. This result is likely to be true as long as the level of care affects the quality of 
the product and if the affected qualities cannot be ascertained before purchase. In 
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Gray-market imports whose quality is inferior to the higher-
quality authorized product also harm U.S. trademark owners. A 
manufacturer may have several reasons for using the same trade-
mark in more than one country.92 Although the manufacturer 
might choose to use the same trademark in two or more countries, 
it may prefer to market slightly different products in different 
countries, in order to cater to local tastes. The product in one 
country might actually be of lower quality than the product in 
another country, or it might simply be of different but not 
necessarily lesser quality. 9:1 In either case, the unauthorized im-
portation of the genuine product will harm the goodwill of the 
domestic trademark owner. 
Some of the problems with gray-market goods include foreign 
language instruction manuals,!14 metric components that cannot 
be replaced in the United States, warranties not valid in the 
United States,!"' out-of-season merchandise,% and "seconds" qual-
ity merchandise that had already been rejected. ''7 A consumer 
who associates certain qualities with a brand is likely to be 
disappointed when the inferior-quality gray-market import is dif-
ferent, and, consequently, he will reduce his estimate of the 
brand's quality. 98 As a result, the consumer will be less willing 
Duracell there was an allegation that importers were not properly handling the gray-
market batteries. The Commission, however, refused to find that there was any 
measurable difference between the authorized and unauthorized batteries. Duracell, supra 
note 3, at 30; see also Osawa, 589 F. Supp. at 1168-70. 
92. See infra notes 126-134 and accompanying text. 
93. For example, a soft drink manufacturer might use the same trademark in two 
different countries, but produce a sweeter drink in one of these countries in order to 
cater to slightly different tastes. Ste Russell, In the Glare of the Rising Sun, TtME, Oct. 
13, 1986, at 71. 
94. Osawa, 589 F. Supp. at 1168. 
95. /d. at 1167. 
96. Monte Carlo Shirt, Inc. v. Daewoo lnt'l (America) Corp., 707 F.2d 1054 (9th 
Cir. 1983). 
97. El Greco Leather Products Co. v. Shoe World, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 1380 
(E.D.N.Y. 1984). 
98. A common problem with gray-market imports is that they are often not covered 
by U.S. warranties. A consumer who buys a camera and then discovers that it is not 
covered by a domestic warranty has been misled about a valuable element of the 
purchase. Thus, Judge Leva! found that purchasers of gray-market MAMIY A cameras 
expected them to be covered by Bell & Howell's warranty and would become hostile 
to the MAMIYA trademark if their warranty claims were not honored. See Osawa, 589 
F. Supp. at 1169. 
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to purchase that brand in the future, decreasing the domestic 
trademark owner's sales. !19 
The Fourth Cause of Gray-Market Imports: Arbitraging International 
Price Differences 
The fourth cause of gray-market imports is arbitraging monop-
oly price differences. Price discrimination occurs when the ratio 
of price to marginal cost is different across markets. 100 In any 
market, this ratio depends on the elasticity of demand facing a 
given producer. The less elastic is demand, the greater is the 
ratio of price to marginal cost. 101 Therefore, price discrimination 
against the U.S. market is rational only if the manufacturer faces 
a less elastic demand curve in the United States than abroad. 10~ 
If a monopolist were practicing price discrimination against 
U.S. consumers, then independent importers would have an in-
centive to purchase the product abroad, import it into the United 
States, and sell it to U.S. consumers. If the U.S. trademark owner 
could not exclude gray-market imports, arbitrage would eventually 
raise the price abroad and reduce the price in the United States 
until they were equal}03 As a result, U.S. welfare would increase 
because the gray-market imports would have reduced the anti-
competitive U.S. price. 104 
Monopoly is widely recognized to be inefficient and socially 
harmful. 111" If a monopolist were using section 526 to segregate 
99. The harm from inferior quality gray-market merchandise depends on consumers 
being confused about the source of the merchandise, whereas the harm from gray-
market merchandise in general exists whether or not there is consumer confusion. 
100. Price discrimination includes the practice of charging a different price for the 
same product to different consumers even though the cost of sale to each of them is 
the same. Price discrimination, however, does not include the practice of charging a 
different price to different consumers when the differences can be accounted for by 
differences in the cost of sale. See R. PosNER, supra note 26, at 62. 
101. J. HJRSHLEJFER, supra note 21, at 351-56. 
102. /d.; see also R. PoSNER, supra note 26, at 62. 
103. Strictly speaking, arbitrage will make the price difference disappear only when 
there are zero transportation and transaction costs. When these costs are positive, 
arbitrage will drive the price difference down so that the price in the high-priced market 
exceeds the price in the low-priced market by the total transportation and transaction 
costs. Set J. HJRSCHLEIFER, supra note 21, at 236-49. 
I 04. See generally F. ScHERER, supra note 19, at ch. 11. 
105. Set R. PosNER, supra note 26, at ch. 2; J. HJRSCHLEJFER, supra note 21, at 344-
48. 
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markets in order to discriminate against the U.S. market, some 
form of remedial action might be appropriate. Supporters of gray-
market imports have generally assumed that monopolistic price 
discrimination is the source of all gray-market imports. 106 This is 
incorrect because there are at least three other sources of gray-
market imports. 107 If the U.S. price exceeds the foreign price 
because the product has a better reputation in the United States, 
because more services are provided in the United States, or 
because a higher-quality product is sold in the United States, then 
the price difference is not a result of price discrimination. As long 
as other manufacturers produce competitive products, there is no 
reason to assume that any price differences are not the result of 
differences in reputation or services that the trademark owner has 
provided to consumers. 108 Consequently, gray-market imports that 
result from monopolistic price discrimination are limited to in-
stances in which the trademark owner has a monopoly in the 
product market. 109 
In order for a seller to maintain a monopoly in a U.S. product 
market, other firms must be prevented from entering the market 
and driving down the price. 1111 Whether a seller has market power 
is an empirical question that must be determined on a case-by-
case basis. There are, however, several reasons to expect that 
U.S. manufacturers generally do not have greater market power 
in the United States than in the foreign markets from which gray-
market goods come. 111 First, barriers to international trade are 
106. See, e.g., Dam, supra note 6, at 48. 
107. See supra text accompanying notes 62-99. 
108. See LEXECON INc., supra note 2, at 50-56. 
109. See supra text accompanying notes 20-29. 
110. See R. PosNER, supra note 26, at 59. 
111. When the trademark owner has a monopoly in both the domestic product 
market and the foreign product market, then gray-market imports will prevent monopoly 
price discrimination, but perhaps not monopolistic pricing. Preventing the trademark 
owner from segregating the two markets will destroy its monopoly power only when 
the foreign market is competitive. Furthermore, a trademark owner that has monopoly 
power in a domestic market, if it has met the conspiracy requirement, would be guilty 
of a violation of the Sherman Act: 
172 
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine 
or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the 
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be 
deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by 
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generally significantly lower in the United States than abroad for 
most commodities. 11 ~ Second, there is little evidence to suggest 
that product markets are more concentrated in the United States 
than elsewhere. The available data, in fact, support the opposite 
conclusion}n Third, many industries plagued with gray-market 
imports are neither highly concentrated nor generally considered 
to be characterized by anticompetitive pricing. 114 Therefore, mo-
nopolistic price discrimination is not likely to be a very important 
cause of gray-market imports. 
The Effects of Gray-Market Imports on the Development of International 
Markets 
By reducing the return to manufacturers that develop and 
promote high-quality products, gray-market imports will not only 
reduce the quality and number of goods in the marketplace and 
the level of associated services, 115 they will also affect the devel-
opment of international markets. Denying U.S. trademark owners 
the right to exclude genuine merchandise bearing the identical 
trademark and intended for sale abroad will reduce the willingness 
both of U.S. companies to enter foreign markets and of foreign 
companies to enter the U.S. market. 
When an established U.S. company decides to market its prod-
uct in a foreign country in which it is not yet established, it can 
either develop a new trademark or promote the original. Benefits 
on both the cost and demand sides favor promoting the original 
fine not exceeding one million dollars if a corporation, or if any other person, 
one hundred thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, 
or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court. 
Sherman Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). Therefore, the complaint against restricting 
gray-market imports is misdirected. The real cause for concern is the monopoly in the 
product market in the United States. Price discrimination is a secondary concern. To 
the extent that gray-market imports are the result of monopolistic price discrimination, 
relief under the antitrust laws directly aimed at the monopoly in the product market is 
the appropriate remedy. 
112. Deardorff & Stern, The Economic Effect of Complete Elimination of Post- Tokyo Round 
Tariffs, in TRADE Poucv IN THE 1980's 674-75 (Table 20.1) (W. Cline ed. 1983); 
Nogues, Olechonski, Winters, The Extent of Nontarif.f Barriers to Industrial Countries' Imports, 
1 WoRLD BANK EcoN. REv. 181, 191-94 (1986). 
113. F. ScHERER, supra note 19, at 50-54. 
114. See LEXECON INc., supra note 2, at 26-56. 
115. See supra notes 62-99 and accompanying text. 
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trademark. The domestic company's original trademark, even 
though it is not as well known abroad, still has some value that 
makes it worth promoting. If the goods intended for sale abroad 
are imported into the United States, the company's return from 
the goodwill it has established in the United States will decline 
as sales are taken away by the gray-market imports. Thus, the 
domestic corporation's return from developing the foreign market 
decreases when gray-market goods cannot be excluded. Conse-
quently, if the U.S. trademark owner cannot exclude genuine 
merchandise bearing the identical trademark, it will be less likely 
to enter a foreign market because its expected profit will fall. 
Similarly, a foreign corporation's profit from entering the U.S. 
market will be lower if it is unable to exclude gray-market im-
ports}16 A foreign manufacturer, therefore, will hesitate to enter 
the U.S. market if it cannot exclude gray-market imports. As a 
result, U.S. consumers may pay higher prices and face a reduced 
selection of goods. 
Summary 
This section has presented the four causes of gray-market im-
ports. Three of these causes-free riding on goodwill, free riding 
on services, and inferior quality merchandise-suggest that gray-
market goods are injurious to the U.S. economy. Furthermore, 
the first two of these causes do not depend upon consumer 
deception; only the third cause does. Only gray-market imports that 
arbitrage international price differences increase competition in the 
U.S. market. However, for there to be persistent price differences 
that result from market power, there must be barriers to entry into 
the market. It seems unlikely that these barriers are higher in the 
United States than elsewhere. Thus, the fourth cause is probably 
not a very important cause of gray-market imports. Finally, the 
four causes are not mutually exclusive, and any or all can contribute 
in a given situation. 117 
116. At least one camera manufacturer has tried, without success, to prevent gray-
market imports by selling different models in the United States and abroad. Su CoLLADO 
Assoc., supra note 1, at 36-37. 
117. A camera manufacturer, for example, could conceivably have a better market 
reputation in the U.S. than abroad; could require its dealers to maintain larger 
inventories in the U.S.; could sell a superior model in the U.S.; and could have greater 
market power in the United States. In such a case, all four causes would contribute to 
gray-market imports of the camera. 
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REsPoNsEs To GRAY-MARKET IMPORTs 1111 
The current U.S. approach to gray-market imports is based on 
section 526 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 1 HI and the regulations 
promulgated by the U.S. Department of the Treasury under 
section 526(d). 120 The current regulations allow a domestic trade-
mark owner to exclude gray-market imports only if the domestic 
trademark owner is unrelated to the foreign trademark owner and 
if the foreign goods do not bear a trademark licensed by the 
domestic trademark owner. On the other hand, if the domestic 
and the foreign trademark owners are related or if the foreign 
goods bear a trademark licensed by the domestic trademark owner, 
then the domestic trademark owner does not have the right to 
exclude the goods. 1 ~ 1 Private means of preventing gray-market 
imports, such as using different trademarks or denying warranty 
service to gray-market goods, are legal. 122 
The illogic of the current policy is that the relationship between 
the U.S. trademark owner and the foreign trademark owner is 
unrelated to the underlying cause of the gray-market imports. 1 ~:1 
A manufacturer can have market power and engage in price 
discrimination regardless of the relationship between the domestic 
and the foreign trademark owners. 124 Similarly, a trademark will 
118. For a discussion of the options being considered by the administration, see 
Inside U.S. Trade, supra note 16, at 1, 8-10. 
119. 19 U.S.C. S 1526 (1982). Set note 14 supra for the text of the statute. 
120. 19 C.F.R. S 133.21 (1985). See note 15 supra for the text of the regulations. 
121. Id.; sualsoOsawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163, 1177 (S.D.N.Y. 
1984). 
122. Ste infra notes 126-141 and accompanying text. To the best of my knowledge, 
such policies have never been the basis of an antitrust suit. The use of section 526, 
however, was the basis for the Guerlain antitrust case. Set supra notes 30-40 and 
accompanying text. 
123. Osawa, 589 F. Supp. at 1177-78. 
124. Calvin Collier, a former Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission, has 
argued that this distinction is rational. He begins by noting that monopolistic price 
discrimination, which is the practice of charging different prices to customers in different 
markets, allows a monopolist to increase its profits. An obvious condition for price 
discrimination is that the manufacturer's goods be sold in both markets. In addition, 
a manufacturer can price discriminate only if it can separate the foreign and domestic 
markets. Customs' approach would not aUow related parties to sell in the two markets 
and still keep the markets separate. Thus, he argues that the current policy deters price 
discrimination. Speech by Calvin Collier, Competition Policy and Parallel Imports, Second 
Annual Judicial Conference, United States Court of International Trade (Oct. 23, 
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always represent the local goodwill, and a trademark can be 
supported with different services or denote different goods in 
different countries, regardless of the relationship between the two 
trademark owners.•l~ 
1985). The problem with this argument is that monopolistic price discrimination is not 
facilitated by having a related U.S. trademark owner. A foreign manufacturer with 
market power, or a foreign cartel, can practice price discrimination against U.S. 
consumers with an unrelated U.S. trademark owner as easily as with a related one. 
The foreign manufacturer only has to charge the U.S. trademark owner a higher price 
for the good in order to earn its anticompetitive profit. For example, assume the 
competitive European price for a widget in local currency is equivalent to $5, but the 
U.S. monopoly price is $10. Further, assume that dealers' sales-related costs are $2 a 
unit and that distribution costs are $1 a unit on both sides of the Atlantic. If the foreign 
manufacturer owned both distributors, then it would charge European retailers $3 and 
U.S. retailers $7, and its out-of-pocket expenses would be $1 a unit. Now, if there 
were an independent U.S. distributor, the foreign manufacturer would charge the 
distributor $6 a unit, but it would have no out-of-pocket expenses for the widgets sold 
in the United States. As a result, the manufacturer's sales and profits would be exactly 
the same in the two sets of circumstances. Although the relation between the U.S. and 
the foreign trademark owner has nothing to do with the ability to price discriminate, 
the foreign trademark owner's control over its foreign chain of distribution does; the 
farther down the chain of distribution is the first sale to an independent party, the 
easier is price discrimination. Breaking down the barrier that separates the two markets 
is more difficult the greater the manufacturer's control of its chain of distribution 
because lot sizes decrease and unit prices increase down the chain of distribution. The 
net effect is to make it more expensive for independent importers to assemble a 
commercial lot when they have to make their purchases from retailers instead of 
wholesalers. SeeR. PosNER & F. EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST 874-75 (2d ed. 1981). Customs' 
regulations, however, have never considered the extent of the foreign trademark owner's 
vertical integration in its home market. /d. 
125. Essentially this justification was adopted by the Second Circuit in Olympus when 
it argued that the regulations permit the Customs Service to distinguish between cases 
where the trademark owner has independent domestic goodwill and those where the 
trademark owner is engaged in price discrimination: 
176 
The administrative difficulties inherent in requiring the Customs Service to 
exclude gray market goods make clear why Customs has long and consistently 
interpreted section 526 to allow it to refuse to exclude the goods. Absent this 
bright line for administrative enforcement, the Customs Service would expand 
resources excluding goods when later private litigation could disclose that the 
markholder lacked isolable domestic good will and was merely engaging in 
price discrimination or other behavior questionable as a matter of antitrust 
law. Regulations that attempted to permit exclusion only of goods the mark-
holders of which possessed disqete domestic good will would, as Judge Sifton 
pointed out, place the Customs Service "in the position of having to determine 
at th~ time of border crossing whether the domestic trademark holder had 
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Pn'vate Solutions 
The current U.S. policy towards gray-market goods allows a 
U.S. trademark owner to prevent the importation of gray-market 
goods when the owner can do so purely through private means. 
The most obvious way that U.S. trademark owners could attempt 
to reduce gray-market imports is by using different trademarks 
in the United States and abroad. Thus, one of the arguments for 
not imposing any government restrictions on gray-market imports 
is that the trademark owners brought the problem of gray-market 
goods on themselves, because they used identical trademarks in 
their domestic and foreign markets. 126 A manufacturer that sells 
its product in two or more markets may use different marks in 
various countries. 127 Third parties would then be less likely to 
import the goods intended for sale abroad because the imports 
with an unknown trademark would be less highly valued than the 
identical goods with the recognized trademark. 
There are two problems with this argument. First, the manu-
facturer gains several advantages from using the same trademark 
developed an independent public image in this country. "(citation omitted) 
Olympus Corp. v. United States, 792 F.2d 315, 320 (2d Cir. 1986). The Second Circuit 
is incorrect. The regulations do not identify instances where price discrimination is 
more likely to occur. A foreign trademark owner can discriminate against U.S. con-
sumers just as easily by charging U.S. customers a higher price as by charging a U.S. 
distributor a high price. Supra note. 117. If, however, what the Second Circuit means 
is that the U.S. trademark owner has promoted the brand and has provided the services 
to support it, then such activities can occur as easily with a related U.S. trademark 
owner as with an independent one. Compare Olympus, 792 F.2d 315, with Osawa & Co. 
v. B & H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). 
126. See COP/AT, supra note 3, at 14 ("Defendants ... argue that once a trademark 
owner has authorized the foreign manufacturer to apply the trademark to goods, the 
trademark owner himself has introduced the articles into commerce and cannot thereafter 
unreasonably restrict the use of the product."). 
127. It can be argued that the cost of gray-market imports to trademark owners 
must be small because they could have avoided the problem by using different trade-
marks in the United States and abroad. This, however, is not accurate. First, the large 
sums of money being spent by trademark owners litigating gray-market cases and 
trying to persuade Congress and the Executive would suggest otherwise. More impor-
tantly, the failure to choose to promote different trademarks is the result of a decision 
often made many years ago. At the time, the trademark owners may have underesti-
mated the likelihood and significance of the potential problem. It cannot be concluded 
today, therefore, that because the costs of choosing to use different trademarks many 
years ago would have been low, that the costs to trademark owners from gray-market 
imports is low. 
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at home and abroad that would be lost if a different trademark 
were used in each country. '~8 Thus, even if a manufacturer could 
prevent transshipping by using different marks at home and 
abroad, the law should not encourage this. Because trademarks 
are expensive to develop,'~" a manufacturer, by using the same 
trademark at home and abroad, may be able to achieve significant 
cost savings. In order to prevent all possible transshipping, how-
ever, a manufacturer must use a different trademark and trade-
dress in each country. Thus, the costs of developing trademarks 
and tradedress are reduced when the same trademark and trade-
dress can be used throughout the world.nn 
The advantages of using the same trademark at home and 
abroad, furthermore, are probably larger on the demand side 
than on the cost side. Because national boundaries can be signif-
icant barriers to the flow of information, a trademark recognized 
and highly regarded in one country might have only the most 
faint recognition in a second country, where the manufacturer is 
not yet selling its product. Several reasons exist, however, that support 
the manufacturer's use of the same trademark in the domestic 
and foreign markets. Whatever small amount of goodwill the 
trademark has in the country the manufacturer is yet to enter 
would be lost if the manufacturer were to use a different trade-
mark. In addition, advertising in media that reach more than one 
country would be more effective if the same trademark were used 
in both countries.~:~• Moreover, people who travel or live abroad 
would not be able to purchase their favorite brand unless they 
were aware that the manufacturer used different trademarks in 
different countries. m 
128. See J. GILSON, supra note 49, § 1.03(5). 
129. For a discussion of what is involved in establishing trademark rights m the 
United States, see J. GILSON, supra note 49, § 3. 
130. The manufacturer can also save on the cost of advertising when the same 
trademark is used throughout the world because the same advertising campaign may 
be used in two or more countries. However, with a different trademark and tradename 
in each country, the manufacturer might have to use a different campaign in each 
country. 
131. For example, during the recent World Cup in Mexico, the stands surrounding 
the playing field were turned into billboards for well-known brands, to be seen on 
television sets around the world. Such advertising would not be possible unless the 
same trademark were used throughout much of the soccer-playing world. 
132. Using the same trademark in all countries in which the good is sold will allow 
the manufacturer to internalize the benefits from the goodwill it has developed. If 
different marks were used in different countries, then some of the goodwill would be 
lost. 
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The second flaw in the argument that U.S. trademark owners 
brought the problem of gray-market imports on themselves by 
using identical trademarks in their domestic and foreign markets 
is that a manufacturer might not be able to protect itself from 
the harm caused by gray-market imports simply by using different 
trademarks at home and abroad.•:n Under current U.S. intellec-
tual property law, a retailer could probably advertise the product 
as a gray-market import manufactured by the foreign trademark 
owner in the same plant as the product bearing the domestic 
trademark. 1H Therefore, the gray-market importer would still 
benefit from the goodwill and services associated with the mark. 
A second way to try to stop transshipping is to use private 
contracts. Manufacturers could require their distributors to agree 
not to sell to gray-market importers. Many countries, however, 
enforce laws that prevent manufacturers from using private con-
tracts to restrict transshipping. The two most important examples 
of such laws are the antitrust laws of the Economic Community 
(EC) and the licensing restrictions of foreign countries. In contrast 
to current U.S. antitrust law, which permits manufacturers to 
impose non price, vertical restraints if reasonable, 135 the antitrust 
law of the EC treats both price and nonprice, vertical restraints 
as illegal per se.•:H; Thus, the antitrust laws of the EC prevent 
U.S. trademark owners from requiring that their distributors not 
sell their trademarked merchandise to importers for sale abroad 
and from terminating those distributors that knowingly sell to 
gray-market importers. m 
133. See infra text accompanying notes 150-153. 
134. See infra notes 148-150 and accompanying text; J. GILSON, supra note 49, 
§ 5.09[3). 
135. See, e.g., Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., at 58 (manufacturers may 
impose vertical restrictions when no anticompetitive effects are shown to result). 
136. Article 85( I) of the Treaty of Rome prohibits agreements "which have as their 
object or result the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the Common 
Market .... " Treaty of Rome, 298 U.N.T.S. 47-48 (entered into force jan. 1, 1958). 
This clause has been interpreted as prohibiting export restrictions in contracts between 
private parties, except in narrow circumstances. See Kinkeldey, Pitfalls of Trademark Licensing 
in the EEC, 72 TRADE-MARK REP. 145 (1982). 
137. See J. GILSON, supra note 49, S 9.01(4) (articles 85 and 86 of Rome Treaty 
prohibit granting of exclusive territorial trademark licenses). Moreover, by outlawing 
vertical restraints, the EC makes it difficult for manufacturers to induce retailers to 
provide special services. Thus, it is likely that U.S. brands are supported by more 
services than their EC counterparts, thereby providing an incentive for gray-market 
importers to divert goods from the EC to the United States. 
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In addition to the antitrust laws of the EC, a number of 
countries ha,ve licensing provisions that prevent U.S. trademark 
owners from enforcing a ban on exports to the United States. In 
order to conduct business in many countries, a foreign trademark 
owner must license its trademark. 1:18 In many of these countries 
where licensing is a legal or economic necessity, trademark licenses 
must be registered with the government to be enforceable. 1:19 The 
laws in these countries frequently prohibit the registration of a 
license that contains any export restrictions, including restrictions 
that apply to the licensor's own country. 1411 In order to do business 
in many countries, therefore, the foreign trademark owner must 
give up the right to prevent the product's exportation, even to 
countries where the chain of distribution exists. 111 
Foreign antitrust and licensing restrictions strengthen the case 
for adopting a public law solution to the gray-market problem. 
Because of the EC antitrust law, a U.S. firm that wants to sell 
in the EC will be unable to use private means to prevent gray-
market imports. Similarly, the harm resulting from foreign licen-
sing regulations that hinder the entry of U.S. firms into foreign 
markets can be alleviated by a strong gray-market policy. 
Alternative Public Remedies 
Apart from the private means available to trademark owners, 
there are several proposals that deal directly with the problems 
of gray-market goods. One proposal would require retailers to 
disclose to potential purchasers that they sell gray-market goods. This 
approach, called labeling, is inadequate to deal with gray-market 
imports because it could only prevent the sale of inferior-quality 
gray-market goods. A second proposal would require obliterating 
the trademark on gray-market goods. This approach,. termed 
138. In some countries licensing is required by law, whereas in others it is not 
required by law but is a practical necessity. For example, high tariffs or nontariff 
barriers can make importation infeasible and domestic laws requiring local ownership 
can prevent the foreign trademark owner from establishing a branch operation or 
subsidiary. See CoLLADO Assoc., supra note 1, at 72. 
139. J. GILSON, supra note 49, S 9.01[4). 
140. See J. GILSON, supra note 49, S 9.01(4) (many countries require trademark 
license agreements to be recorded in the local trademark office or other governmental 
agency). 
141. J. GILSON, supra note 49, S 9.01[4). 
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demarking, theoretically could prevent a free ride on the services 
and reputation associated with the trademark, while allowing 
arbitrage to occur where there is market power. In practice, 
however, demarking is likely to be much less effective. A third 
proposed solution to the gray-market problem is to use private 
legal remedies. This is the approach adopted by the Federal 
Circuit in Vivitar Corp. v. United States, when it held that Customs 
was not required to exclude gray-market imports, but U.S. trade-
mark owners could pursue their private law remedies. 112 The 
fourth proposal is a ban on gray-market goods. Only a ban would 
adequately protect the interests of U.S. trademark owners. 
Labeling 
The first proposal-labeling-requires disclosure. Under the 
labeling approach, gray-market retailers would inform potential 
customers that the product is not authorized by the U.S. trade-
mark owner.•·n Such a requirement would not prevent gray-
market imports that take a free ride on a domestic trademark 
owner's reputation or the services provided to consumers. At 
most, labeling can only prevent confusion. 144 Although confusion 
is often involved with gray-market merchandise, the problem with 
gray-market goods is not that consumers are confused, but that 
they know what they are getting. 145 Therefore, labeling cannot 
prevent the harm caused by gray-market imports. 1111 
142. Vivitar Co. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552, 1569-70 (Fed. Cir. 1985); m also 
Olympus Corp. v. United States, 792 F.2d 315, 320-21 (2d Cir. 1986). 
143. See CoLLADO Assoc., supra note I, at 61-64. 
144. Labeling will not even be able to prevent confusion when the item is inexpensive, 
the expected injury from purchasing an unauthorized item is small, and the trademark 
is well recognized and highly regarded. In these cases labeling is likely to be ineffective 
because consumers are unlikely to read the labels. See Durau/1, supra note 3, at 40. 
145. The Court of International Trade made this mistake in Vivitar when it declared 
that the owner of the trademark "could protect itself against free riding by using 
marketing and labeling practices to make clear that goods plaintiff sells abroad are not 
supported by the same services as those plaintiff sells in the United States.'' Vivitar, 
593 F. Supp. 420, 435 (Ct. lnt'l Trade 1984), a.ff'd, 761 F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
146. This mistake was made in a similar situation by Justice Holmes in his concurring 
opinion in International News Service in which Justice Holmes stated that the only remedy 
available to AP was to have INS acknowledge that the news was collected by AP. Such 
a solution would not have stopped INS from copying the news, because the subscribers 
of INS probably did not care who gathered the news, but only that the news they 
received was accurate. International News Service, 248 U.S. 215, 248 (1918) (Holmes, J., 
concurring). 
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Demarking 
The second proposal-demarking-requires that the gray-mar-
ket importer obliterate the trademark on the product. This pro-
posal is aimed precisely at the injury caused by gray-market 
imports. The free riding and inferior-quality goods causes of gray-
market imports all rely on the strength of the domestic trademark 
(whereas the monopolistic price discrimination rationale is based 
on the product itself). If the imported merchandise did not bear 
the U.S. trademark, the merchandise would not benefit from the 
goodwill or services associated with the trademark. In addition, 
consumers would not be fooled into purchasing inferior-quality 
goods based on the trademark. Finally, competing goods would 
not be kept out when the trademark owner engaged in monopo-
listic price discrimination. 147 
Although a remedy that prevented consumers from associating 
the goods with the trademark would solve the problems raised by 
gray-market goods, demarking does not prevent consumers from 
making this association. There are several reasons to expect that 
demarking will not prevent consumers from learning the source 
of the merchandise. The most obvious problem with demarking 
involves goods that prominently display trademarks. Clothing-
especially sports shirts-and leather goods-especially handbags-
most readily come to mind as goods that would not be susceptible 
to demarking because obliterating the trademark would destroy 
the goods. Moreover, a policy of demarking would encourage 
manufacturers to increase the prominence of their trademarks on 
147. One argument made against a demarking proposal is that it denies consumers 
information that would be valuable to them. It is argued that consumers have the right 
to know the source of the goods they buy, and that demarking denies them this right. 
See, e.g., Collier, supra note 124. The difficulty with this argument is that there is no 
such absolute right. Avoiding consumer confusion is only one of the purposes of 
trademark law. The other is protecting the goodwill of trademark owners. In this 
instance, the consumer's interest in information is in conflict with the trademark owner's 
interest in protecting its goodwill. Furthermore, there is no deception in this case. 
Deception occurs when consumers buy goods from one source but believe the goods to 
be from another source. This does not happen when goods are demarked. Instead, 
consumers do not know the source of the goods, but they know they do not know the 
source. Thus, there is no deception. Furthermore, there is no policy against selling 
well·known goods without a trademark. This is commonly done by firms that produce 
a product ..under a trademark and produce the same product without a trademark so 
that it can be sold by retailers under their own trademarks. 
182 !Vol. 18:145 
GRAY-MARKET IMPORTS 
the goods they sell abroad, 1411 thus making the remedy less effec-
tive. 149 
The applicability of this remedy, furthermore, is likely to be 
limited. Demarking will probably be effective against inexpensive 
goods that all look the same, such as batteries, but not against 
expensive goods with observable differences, such as automobiles. 
For example, if DuRACELL batteries were imported into the United 
States in a black casing without the distinctive copper top and 
without a trade name on them, they would not be recognized as 
DuRACELL batteries. On the other hand, a MERCEDES-BENZ au-
tomobile without the three-pointed emblem and with the name 
MERCEDES- BENZ obliterated would still be recognized for what it 
was. In the latter case, demarking would not be an effective 
remedy because the product could still be recognized. 150 
The final reason why demarking would be ineffective against 
gray-market imports is that the current state of intellectual prop-
erty law would probably not prevent a retailer from using the 
trademark in truthful advertising in a manner that would allow 
it to take a free ride on the trademark owner's goodwill. Thus, 
in the DuRACELL battery example, a retailer could probably say 
that the batteries were manufactured by Duracell in Belgium. 1'11 
Of course, a demarking policy would increase the cost to retailers 
of selling gray-market goods, 1''2 but there is no reason to expect 
that these costs would be high enough to deter gray-market 
importation. 1'':1 
148. Christopher DeMuth has argued that demarking would be effective because 
trademarks that are clearly displayed are in danger of losing their trademark rights. 
C. DEMUTH, GRAY-MARKET CoMPROMISE: DEMARKING vs. LABELING 10 (1985). This 
is incorrect. As long as a trademark's distinctiveness is maintained, there is no danger 
of its being lost just because it is prominently displayed or frequently used. See A. 
MILLER & M. DAVIS, supra note 49, at 207. 
149. DeMuth, however, suggests that if demarking was not required on goods that 
prominently display their trademarks, then trademark owners would have an incentive 
to stop displaying their trademarks, which would increase the effectiveness of demarking. 
C. DEMUTH, supra note 148, at 10. 
150. Price is likely to be an important element as well. The more expensive the 
article, the greater the incentive to learn about the source. 
151. See, ~.g., Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359 (1924); Champion Spark 
Plug Co. v. Sanders, 331 U.S. 125 (1947); Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562 (9th 
Cir. 1968); J. GILSON, supra note 49, § 5.09[3]. 
152. St~ C. DEMUTH, supra note 148, at 4 n.3. 
153. The gray-market importer will still be able to take a free ride on the U.S. 
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Private Law Remedies 
A third proposal is to permit U.S. trademark owners to pursue 
their private remedies in federal court. Section 526(c) authorizes 
U.S. trademark owners to enjoin importers and retailers from 
dealing in trademarked goods of foreign manufacture imported 
into the United States without the consent of the trademark 
owner. 154 Similarly, the Lanham Act authorizes U.S. trademark 
owners to enjoin violations of the Act and recover damages. w. 
trademark owner's reputation as long as it costs the retailer less to convince consumers 
that its batteries are 0URACELL batteries than the premium associated with DuRACELL 
batteries. 
154. Section 526(c) provides a private right of action for a party injured by a 
violation of section 526(a). The text of section 526, 19 U.S.C. § 1526 (1982), can be 
found in footnote 14, supra. See Vivitar Co. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552, 1570 (Fed. 
Cir. 1985). 
155. The Lanham Act contains two provisions that U.S. trademark owners could 
use to seek private remedies against importers and retailers of gray-market goods. 
Section 32(1) of the Lanham Act provides a private right of action for U.S. trademark 
owners who are harmed by anyone who offers for sale goods bearing a mark that 
infringes a registered trademark: 
Any person who shaU, without the consent of the registrant- use in commerce 
any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered 
mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising 
of any goods or services on or in connection with such use is likely to cause 
confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive .... shall be liable in a civil 
action by the registrant for the remedies hereinafter provided. 
15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (1982). Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act created a federal law of 
unfair competition with a private right of action: 
Any person who shall affix, apply, or annex, or use in connection with atry goods or 
services, or atry container or containers for goods, a false designation of origin, or any 
false description or representation, including words or other symbols tending falsely 
to describe or represent the same, and shall cause such goods or services to 
enter into commerce, and any person who shall with knowledge of the falsity 
of such designation of origin or description or representation cause or procure 
the same to be transported or used in commerce or deliver the same to any 
carrier to be transported or used, shall be liable to a civil action by a try person 
doing business in the locality falsely indicated as that of origin or in the region 
in which said locality is situated, or by that of origin or in the region in which 
said locality is situated, or by any person who believes that he is or is likely to be 
daiTILlged by the use of atry such false description or representation. 
IS U .S.C. § 1125(a) ( 1982) (emphasis added). Section 43(b) of the Lanham Act allows 
a party injured by a violation of section 43(a) to have the offending goods denied entr:y 
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Neither an award of damages nor an injunction would adequately 
protect U.S. trademark owners because both of these remedies 
are applied only against individual importers and not against the 
goods. Thus, with an injunction, the complaining trademark 
owner must identify every individual importer to stop all gray~ 
market imports. This is likely to be very expensive, if not impos-
sible, because the number of importers can be large, and because 
many importers will attempt to avoid detection and invocation of 
U.S. jurisdiction. Moreover, because it is easy to become an 
importer of gray-market merchandise, if the trademark owner is 
successful in enjoining one importer, another importer will take 
its place. Thus, injunctions against individual importers would 
not be effective against .a widespread pattern of importation. An 
award of damages also suffers from the problem that the importing 
can be done by judgment-proof corporations, rather than by 
individuals. 10'1; 
A Ban on Gray-Market Imports 
The most drastic proposal that deals with gray-market imports 
would grant U.S. trademark owners the right to exclude gray-
market imports. Such a ban would prevent gray-market imports 
into the United States: 
(b) Any goods marked or labeled in contravention of the provisions of this 
section shall not be imported into the United States or admitted to entry at 
any customhouse of the United States. The owner, importer or consignee of 
goods refused entry at any customhouse under this section may have recourse 
by protest or appeal that is given under the customs revenue laws or may 
have the remedy given by this chapter in cases involving goods refused entry 
or seized. 
15 U.S.C. § 1125(b) (1982). Section 34 of the Lanham Act authorizes broad injunctive 
relief for a violation of the act, 15 U.S.C. § 1116 (1982), and section 35 permits a 
plaintiff to recover damages from an intentional infringer, 15 U .S.C. § 1117 ( 1982). 
The questions of whether gray-market imports violate sections 32( 1) and 43(a) of the 
Lanham Act, in addition to section 42, are discussed. See infra notes 304-308 and 
accompanying text. 
156. U.S. trademark owners might also file in federal district court and seek to 
have all unauthorized imports excluded. See Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1570. Such a remedy, 
at best, could only delay relief and make it more costly. Alternatively, if trademark 
owners were frequently denied relief on grounds such as a lack of confusion, see Monte 
Carlo Shirt, Inc. v. Daewoo International (America) Corp., 707 F.2d 1054 (9th Cir. 
1983), then the private law remedies would be inadequate to protect against free riding. 
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that take a free ride on the domestic trademark owner's reputation 
or services, as well as inferior-quality gray-market merchandise. 
It would also, however, prevent gray-market goods that result 
from monopolistic price discrimination from entering the United 
States. To the extent that gray-market imports arbitrage such 
international price differences, a ban on gray-market imports 
would be costly to society.m This article, however, suggests that 
there is little likelihood that gray-market imports are, to any 
substantial degree, the result of monopolistic price discrimina-
tion. 1''8 Consequently, the costs from a ban on gray-market im-
ports are likely to be small. 
There may be, however, some cases in which gray-market goods 
result from attempts to engage· in monopolistic price discrimina-
tion. In such cases, a ban would be inappropriate, and it might 
be more efficient to allow these gray-market goods into the United 
States. 1''9 The determination whether there is such market power 
must be made on a case-by-case basis under antitrust law, which 
is better suited to deal with questions of anticompetitive behavior 
than is trademark law. 
Antitrust law should be used to make the determination whether 
the trademark owner can exclude the goods because the appro-
priate question to ask is whether the U.S. trademark owner has 
a monopoly in the product market. 160 Only in this case could a 
ban on gray-market imports be used to engage in monopolistic 
price discrimination for an extended period of time. Since the 
inquiry has nothing to do with consumer confusion or goodwill, 
trademark principles are particularly ill-suited considerations on 
which to base this determination. Consequently, trademark law 
principles cannot be used to distinguish cases where a ban on 
gray-market imports fosters monopoly pricing from those where 
it does not. 
157. See supra notes 100-104 and accompanying text. 
158. See supra notes 100-114 and accompanying text. 
159. Because competition in the product market prevents monopoly pricing, only 
the goods should be admitted. There is no reason to allow the trademark to be used. 
At the very least, labeling would be required in order to prevent consumer confusion. 
The anticompetitive behavior of a trademark owner is no justification for deceiving 
consumers who want to purchase the trademark owner's goods. 
160. The inquiry into whether a trademark owner has a monopoly in a U.S. product 
market should concentrate on whether there are barriers to entry that could prevent 
other firms from entering the market if the trademark owner tried to maintain an 
anticompetitive price. See R. PosNER, supra note 26, at 58-59. 
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Private and Public Eriforcement Compared 
The cost and effectiveness of enforcing a ban on gray-market 
imports favors a public remedy. Goods imported into the United 
States must enter through Customs for processing. The incre-
mental cost of asking importers what trademarks their goods carry 
and comparing these with a list on file is low .161 In contrast to 
government enforcement, the costs of private enforcement would 
be large. A number of private techniques that could be used to 
prevent gray-market imports are illegal in countries where they 
would have to be implemented to be effective. 11;2 Secondly, the 
private law remedies are likely to be both ineffective and costly 
against a widespread pattern of importation because just about 
anyone can import gray-market merchandise and because litiga-
tion can be expensive. 
Currently, a registration fee of $190 must be paid to the 
Commissioner of Customs to record a trademark with the Treas-
ury and to obtain the benefits of section 42 of the Lanham Act 
and section 526 of the Tariff Act. 11;:1 In order to ensure an efficient 
level of enforcement, it would be appropriate to make the regis-
tering trademark owners pay registration fees that cover the full 
cost of enforcement. 11;4 
Such a government policy, furthermore, is not government 
protectionism whereby the government insulates U.S. producers 
from competition. Rather, the government would be enforcing 
private property rights-the right of a U.S. trademark owner to 
the exclusive use of its mark165-because the government can 
enforce these rights more effectively than can U.S. trademark 
owners. The policy would not be protectionist because there would 
be no restriction on the kinds or quantities of goods that could 
be imported into the United States. Moreover, the policy would 
not create a new right in domestic producers to be free from 
competition; it would only enforce an existing trademark right 
161. On the other hand, it would be very expensive to enforce a similar scheme 
entirely within the United States. For example, merchandise that goes from California 
to New York does not have to pass through a customshouse, but can enter New York 
in any one of myriad ways without stopping. 
162. See infra notes 135-141 and accompanying text. 
!63. 19 C.F.R. 5 133.13(b) (1985). 
164. See LEXECON INC., supra note 2, at 90-91. 
165. 15 U.S.C. 51114 (1982). 
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that benefits all U.S. trademark owners, regardless of whether 
their merchandise is produced domestically or imported. 
MoDERN TRADEMARK LAw PRINCIPLES 
Modern U.S. trademark law, a review of early cases dealing 
with gray-market imports, and the statutory provisions protecting 
the rights of U.S. trademark owners reveal a foundation from 
which gray-market imports may be excluded. 
Appropriating Goodwill 
The principle that the goodwill symbolized by a trademark is 
to be protected has been recognized by the courts, by Congress, 
and by commentators. Hili In a widely quoted passage from Mish-
awaka Rubber & Wollen Mfg. Co. v. S. S. Kresge Co. , 167 the U.S. 
Supreme Court, per Justice Frankfurter, held that a trademark 
owner was protected against competitors attempting to expropriate 
the goodwill associated with the trademark: 
The protection of the trade-name is the law's recognition 
of the psychological function of symbols. If it is true that 
we live by symbols, it is no less true that we purchase 
goods by them. A trademark is a merchandising short-cut 
which induces a purchaser to select what he wants, or what 
he has been led to believe he wants. The owner of a mark 
exploits this human propensity by making every effort to 
impregnate the atmosphere of the market with the drawing 
power of a congenial symbol. Whatever the means employed 
the aim is the same-to convey through the mark, in the minds of 
166. See Duracell, supra note 3, at 7-20. At common law, the only function of a 
trademark was to distinguish the source of origin of one good from the source of origin 
of another good, so consumers would not be confused about similar products. As a 
result, there could not be an infringement unless the distinctiveness of the trademark 
was impaired, which is to say, there had to be confusion with respect to the source of 
origin of the defendant's goods. This view of trademark law changed with the enactment 
of the Lanham Act which adopted several elements of the common law of unfair 
competition into federal trademark law. See]. GILSON, supra note 49, § 5.01. Trademark 
rights are now protected against dilution. This is known as the anti-dilution theory of 
trademark law, and has turned trademarks into property in gross. A. MILLER & M. 
DAVIS, supra note 49, §§ 13.1-13.2. 
167. 316 U.S. 203 (1942). 
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potential customers, the desirability of the commodity upon which 
it appears. Once this is attained, the trade-mark owner has something 
of value. /f another poaches upon the commercial magnetism of the 
symbol he has created, the owner can obtain legal redress. l@ 
Judicial relief is granted because the trademark owner has 
established its goodwill through a substantial investment. No 
competitor may expropriate this goodwill by using a confusingly 
similar mark.•w 
In its description of the two-fold purpose of trademark law, 
Congress recognized the trademark owner's right to the return 
from its investment. The Senate Report on the Lanham Act 
states: 
One [purpose of trademark law] is to protect the public so 
it may be confident that, in purchasing a product bearing 
a particular trademark which it favorably knows, it will 
get the product which it asks for and wants to get. Sec-
ondly, where the owner of a trademark has spent energy, time, 
and money in presenting to the public the product, he is protected 
in his investment from its misappropriation by pirates and cheats. 
This is a well established rule of law protecting both the public 
and the trade-mark owner. 170 
To protect trademark owners, Congress included a general 
unfair competition claim within the Lanham Act, 171 and extended 
168. /d. at 205 (emphasis added). 
169. In Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403 (1916), the Court stated: 
The redress that is accorded in trade-mark cases is based upon the party's 
right to be protected in the goodwill of a trade or business . . . . Where a 
party has been in the habit of labeling his goods with a distinctive mark, so 
that the purchasers recognize goods thus marked as being of his production, 
others are debarred from applying the same mark to goods of the same 
description, because to do so would in effect represent their goods to be of 
his production and would tend to deprive him of the profit he might make through the 
sale of the goods which the purchaser intended to buy. Courts afford redress or reliif upon 
the ground that a party has a valuable infLrest in the good-will of his trade or business, 
and in the trademarks adopted to maintain or extend it. 
/d. at 412 (emphasis added). 
170. S. REP. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S. CoDE 
CoNe. & ADMIN. NEws 1274 (emphasis added). 
171. The text of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act can be found in footnote 155, 
supra. 
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the prohibition against confusingly similar trademarks to cover 
any confusion, not only confusion about the source of origin. 172 
Moreover, in order to ensure that the goodwill symbolized by 
the trademark will be protected, a domestic trademark owner can 
enjoin another's use of a similar trademark on noncompeting 
merchandise by proving a likelihood of confusion, without having 
to show that the noncompeting merchandise is of such poor quality 
that the mark will be tainted by the association. A showing of 
trademark confusion is sufficient to enjoin the use of the mark 
because a trademark owner should not have to tolerate having its 
goodwill held hostage by another firm. Thus, Judge Learned 
Hand, in his now classic statement of the injury from using 
another's trademark on noncompeting merchandise, has stated: 
[I]t has of recent years been recognized that a merchant 
may have a sufficient economic interest in the use of his 
mark outside the field of his own exploitation to justify 
interposition by a court. His mark is his authentic seal; by it 
he vouches for the goods which bear it; it carries his name for good 
or ill. If another uses it, he borrows the owner's reputation, whose 
quality no longer lies within his own control. This is an injury, 
even though the borrower does not tarnish it, or divert any sales by 
its use; for a reputation, like a face, is the symbol of its 
possessor and creator, and another can use it only as a 
mask. And so it has come to be recognized that, unless 
the borrower's use is so foreign to the owner's as to insure 
against any identification of the two, it is unlawful. m 
The broader view of the scope of trademark protection has also 
won support among commentators. Thus, Jerome Gilson has 
172. The text of Section 32(1) on the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (1982), can 
be found in footnote 155, supra. In 1962, the Lanham Act was amended to delete the 
italicized phrase in the infringement standard that the defendant's use of the mark be 
"likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive purchasers as to the source 
of origin of such goods or services." This deletion is generally interpreted as expanding the 
scope of the standard for infringement. J. GILSON, supra note 49, § 5.01. 
173. Yale Electric Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1928); see also James 
Burroughs Ltd. v. Sign of the Beefeater, Inc. 540 F.2d 266, 276 (7th Cir. 1976) (It is 
not necessary to show that the trademark owner's reputation is harmed by another's 
use of a similar mark, "the owner of a mark is damaged by a later use of a similar 
mark which places the owner's reputation beyond its control, though no loss in business 
is shown.''); J. GILSON, supra note 49, § 5.05(2]. 
190 [Vol. 18:145 
LAW & POLICY IN INTERNA110NAL BUSINESS 
or colorable imitation of a registered mark in connection 
with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising 
of any goods or services on or in connection with which 
such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, 
or to deceive . . . shall be liable in a civil action by the 
registrant from the remedies [provided in this Act]. 178 
Trademark confusion occurs when consumers incorrectly be-
lieve the U.S. trademark owner stands behind the gray-market 
goods. Thus, purchasers of gray-market MAMIYA cameras may 
believe that Mamiya's U.S. warranty comes with the camera, 17'' 
or that the merchandise is being sold through the usual channel, 
having been given the usual careful handling. 11l0 Such a consumer 
may be disappointed if he discovers that he has purchased some-
thing other than what he bargained for. 1111 Thus, the likelihood 
of confusion as to the proper chain of distribution can satisfy the 
test for trademark infringement. Ill~ This conclusion is supported 
by the 1962 amendment to section 32 which deleted the phrase 
"source of origin of [defend~nt's] goods and services" from the 
standard for trademark confusion, thereby making any kind of 
trademark confusion actionable. 111:1 
With unlabeled gray-market imports, there would be the like-
lihood of confusion as to the identity of the party that distributed 
the goods in the United States. A case can be made that even 
properly labeled gray-market goods satisfy the likelihood-of-con-
fusion standard. This is understood when one considers a gray-
market DuRACELL battery that is clearly labeled as an unauthorized 
import. Assume the gray-market battery only lasted 90 percent 
as long as the average authorized DuRACELL battery. The con-
sumer may not know that his battery was short-lived, and thus 
may think that DURACELL batteries are short-lived. Alternatively, 
178. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(a) (1982). 
179. In Osawa, Judge Leva! found that purchasers of gray-market MAMIYA cameras 
often do not know they are buying gray-market cameras, and thus fully expect them 
to be covered by warranty. Osawa & Co. v. 8 & H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163, 1167-68 
(S.D.N.Y. 1984). 
180. /d.; Duracell, supra note 3, at 28-29. 
181. Duraull, supra note 3, at 30-31. 
182. /d. at 26-33. Co11tra Monte Carlo Shirt, Inc. v. Daewoo International America 
Corp., 707 F.2d 1054, 1058 (9th Cir. 1983) (no confusion possible with genuine goods). 
183. See J. McCARTHY, supra note 45, at 46-47 n.3; supra note 172. 
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he may notice that the battery died early. He still does not know 
whose fault it is. It could be because the unauthorized importer 
did not handle the battery correctly; however, it could also be 
that the battery was defective. The consumer might want to know 
the reason for the problem, and the likelihood of confusion stand-
ard should allow him to know. 184 
The Bourjois Decisions 
BourJois v. Katzel was the first of two gray-market cases to reach 
the U.S. Supreme Court. 1w' In that case, the plaintiff, a New 
York corporation, had purchased in 1913 from a French company 
the latter's entire business for face powder in the United States, 
including the goodwill and the U.S. registered trademarks jAVA 
and BoURJOIS. The French company manufactured the powder in 
France, and the plaintiff packed and sold it in the United States. 1116 
The French 'rompany also packed its face powder in France for 
domestic sale. The defendant, a third party related to neither the 
U.S. company nor the French company, bought powder in France 
that had been packed by the French company, and imported it 
in the original boxes into the United States. The packaging used 
by the French manufacturer resembled the packages used by the 
184. The significance of the Supreme Court's opinion in Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 
264 U.S. 359 (1924), should be limited by the expansion of trademark rights. Coty 
sold face powder under the registered trademark Coty, and Prestonettes purchased this 
powder and rebottled it. Coty sought to restrain Prestonettes' use of the Coty trademark. 
The district court issued a decree that allowed the defendant to put on the face powder 
bottle "Prestonettes, Inc., not connected with Coty." /d. at 367. The court of appeals 
issued an absolute injunction against the use of the Coty mark on the rebottled powder 
in consideration of the delicate nature of the powder. The Supreme Court found the 
circuit court's decree too broad. The Court concluded that the district court's decree 
was appropriate because it was adequate to prevent confusion since consumers would 
know that the contents were manufactured by Coty and repackaged by Prestonette. /d. 
at 369. Preslonettes predated the passage of the Lanham Act by more than 20 years. 
The Lanham Act, however, as amended covers more than confusion as to the source 
of origin, it covers any kind of confusion. Thus, the Supreme Court's holding that the 
disclosure was adequate to prevent confusion does not apply to the broad definition of 
confusion. Nonetheless, even the more recent cases generally permit the use of another's 
trademark in truthful advertising. See supra note 151 and accompanying text. These 
cases, however, do not acknowledge that the goodwill of the trademark owner might 
still be harmed by improper handling. 
185. 260 u.s. 689, 690 (1923). 
186. /d. 
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plaintiff, except that the French boxes bore the label PouoRE DE 
R1z DEjAVA, rather than simply PouDRE DEjAVA. 187 The defendant 
sold the imported power through a retail pharmacy in New York 
City .t88 
The central issue in Katzel was whether defendant infringed the 
plaintiffs U.S. trademark by selling face powder manufactured 
by the same French firm that supplied plaintiff. 1119 The U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit, citing favorably a series of 
earlier circuit court cases, held that there was no infringement, 
and concluded that "[i]f the goods sold are the genuine goods 
covered by the trade-mark, the rights of the owner of the trade-
mark are not infringed. ' ' 1 '10 
The U.S. Supreme Court, in a short and cryptic opinion written 
by Justice Holmes, reversed the court of appeals, and held that 
the defendant's sale of French face powder infringed plaintiffs 
trademark. 191 The Court concluded· that the French company 
would not have been able to sell its U.S. business to the plaintiff 
unless it had agreed not to compete with the plaintiff. Thus, the 
Court stated: 
After the sale the French manufacturers could not have 
come to the United States and have used their old marks 
in competition with the plaintiff. That plainly follows from 
the statute authorizing assignments. If for the purpose of 
evading the effect of the transfer, it had arranged with the 
defendant that she should sell with the old label, we suppose 
that no one would doubt that the contrivance must fail_l' 1~ 
The Court also explicitly rejected the notion that the defendant 
had the right to sell the powder in the United States simply 
because the boxes and powder were the genuine product of the 
French company. The Court stated: 
Ownership of goods does not carry the right to sell them 
with a specific mark. It does not necessarily carry the right 
187. /d. at 691. 
188. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 275 F. 539, 540 (2d Cir. 1921), rev'd, 260 U.S. 689 
(1923). 
189. Katzel, 260 U.S. at 691. 
190. Bourjois, 275 F. at 543. 
191. Katzel, 260 U.S. at 691. 
192. /d. 
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to sell them at all in a given place. If the goods were 
patented in the United States a dealer who lawfully bought 
similar goods abroad from one who had a right to make 
and sell them there could not sell them in the United 
States. 19:1 
The Supreme Court explained that the trademark did not 
simply indicate the French manufacturer, but represented the 
plaintiff and its goodwill: 
(The trademark] deals with a delicate matter that may be 
of great value but that easily is aestroyed, and therefore 
should be protected with corresponding care. It is said that 
the trade mark here is that of the French house and truly 
indicates the origin of the goods. But that is not accurate. 
It is the trade mark of the plaintiff only in the United 
States and indicates in law, and, it is found, by public 
understanding, that the goods come from the plaintiff 
although not made by it. It was sold and could only be 
sold with the good will of the business that the plaintiff 
bought. It stakes the reputation of the plaintiff upon the 
character of the goods. 1!14 
Trademark Tem"toriality 
The Supreme Court in Katzel rejected the principle of univer-
sality, upon which a number of earlier circuit court opinions had 
been based, 1'15 and established the principle of the territoriality of 
trademarks. According to the principle of universality, a trade-
mark placed on merchandise in one country by an authorized 
party could not infringe the trademark rights of another party in 
another country when the goods were transported from the first 
193. /d. at 692 (citation omitted). 
194. /d. (citations omitted). 
195. See, e.g., Apollinaris Co. v. Scherer, 27 F. 18,21 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1816) (rejecting 
right of patent owner to prevent sale or use of product outside of territorial limits of 
license); Bourjois, 275 F. at 539 (holding importation and sale in United States of article 
bearing trademark under which it is sold in the foreign country where it is made does 
not infringe American trademark on same imported article). 
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country to the second country. I% The principle of territoriality, 
on the other hand, stands for two propositions: ( 1) that a trade-
mark has a separate legal existence under each country's laws, 
and (2) that a trademark symbolizes the goodwill of the owner of 
the national mark. m The first proposition states the definition of 
territoriality; the second states its rationale. 
The principle of universality is related to the principle of 
exhaustion, which allows a trademark owner to control only the 
first sale of a trademarked good. 198 Once the first sale is made, 
the -trademark owner's rights are exhausted and subsequent sales 
can be made by owners of the merchandise, without infringing 
the trademark. As applied to the gray-market, the exhaustion 
doctrine implies that the trademark owner's rights are exhausted 
when the first sale abroad is made. Thus, there can be no 
infringement when the goods are imported and sold in the United 
States. 
Once it is recognized that a trademark has a separate legal 
existence in the United States, the exhaustion doctrine is no longer 
relevant in the context of gray-market imports. The sale of the 
merchandise abroad exhausts the local trademark owner's interest, 
but not that of the U.S. trademark owner. The local trademark 
owner's interest remains until it sells the good. Consequently, 
when the gray-market good is imported into the United States, 
it is bearing a trademark that copies or simulates a U.S. trade-
mark.•'''' 
A number of opinions have suggested that the gray-market 
import does not necessarily bear a mark that is a copy or simu-
lation of the U.S. trademark. These opinions suggest that it must 
also be shown that the trademark owner has established local 
goodwill in order for the gray-market import to bear a mark that 
copies or simulates a U.S. trademark. ~011 Evidence of such local 
goodwill would presumably include advertising expenditures, war-
ranty service, or a public perception that the U.S. importer is 
196. See Derenberg, Territorial Scope and the Situs of Trademarks and Good Will, 47 VA. 
L. REV. 733, 734 (1961). 
197. See Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163, 1171-72 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); 
Dcrenberg, supra note 196, at 734. 
198. Osawa, 589 F. Supp. at 1172. 
199. !d. 
200. See, e.g., Olympus Corp. v. United States, 792 F.2d 315, 320 (2d Cir. 1986). 
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the party behind the trademark. 2111 This view is mistaken. U.S. 
law creates the separate legal existence, and the reason behind 
the law is to protect the local goodwill. In every case in which 
there is a valid U.S. trademark, there is local goodwill. 2112 In order 
to establish local goodwill, there is nothing to prove other than 
than the existence of a valid trademark. Therefore, relief would 
always be granted, which would undermine any attempt to dis-
tinguish among trademarks on the basis of whether they represent 
local goodwill. ~o:• 
Rationale of Katzel 
One of the many questions in the debate on the gray market 
concerns the rationale of the Supreme Court in Katzel. Propo-
nents of the gray market argue that the decision stands for the 
proposition that subsequent to the sale of a national business, the 
sale of goods manufactured by the sold business in the country 
of the purchaser by anyone else infringes the trademark. ~114 Such 
an interpretation would imply that only independent U.S. trade-
mark owners would be protected against gray.:market goods. Pro-
ponents of this position point to the facts of Katzel-particularly 
to the sale of the U.S. business and to the passage about the sale 
of the business. ~05 The difficulty with this interpretation is that 
the first passage cited is an argument by analogy, and not an 
explanation why the face powder imported by defendant infringed 
plaintiffs trademarks. An alternative interpretation of Katzel ar-
gues that the plaintiffs trademark was infringed because the U.S. 
trademark represented the local goodwill of the U.S. trademark 
owner.~~~~; The question still remains, however, whether the reg-
201. Osawa, 589 F. Supp. at 1173. 
202. If this were not true the trademark would have no value, it would not be 
distinctive of a class of goods, and it would therefore not be a trademark. 
203. The Customs Service has argued that the regulations are justified on the grounds 
of administrative convenience by preventing Customs from determining whether the 
trademark owner has isolated domestic goodwill. Olympus, 792 F.2d at 320; 627 F. 
Supp. at 921. Such an interpretation, however, incorrectly assumes that there can be 
a meaningful inquiry into the question whether the trademark owner has developed 
independent goodwill in the U.S. 
204. See, e.g., &II & Howell, 548 F. Supp. 1063, 1066 (E.D.N.Y. 1982). 
205. /d. at 1066; see supra notes 186-198 and accompanying text. 
206. Proponents of this position point to the language cited in the passage quoted 
above. This passage leads to the conclusion that the trademarks were infringed. 
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istered trademarks protected the plaintiffs local goodwill because 
the public perceived the plaintiff as the source of the goods, 
although not their manufacturer, or whether the trademark pro-
tected the plaintiffs local goodwill irrespective of the public's 
perception. 
Whatever the logic of the Katzel decision at the time it was 
written/07 trademark law has evolved and expanded its protection 
to reduce (if not to eliminate entirely) the importance of the 
public's actual perception. Today, it is generally recognized that 
a trademark can represent an anonymous source, and need not 
represent a manufacturer. ~08 Moreover, a line of trademark cases 
recognizes that trademark owners should not be placed in positions 
where their goodwill can be destroyed by the actions of other 
parties. ~m' Thus, if the Court's holding in Katzel was that the gray-
market face powder infringed the U.S. trademark because the 
public perceived the domestic trademark owner as the source, 
current trademark law holds that this public perception is irrele-
vant. Therefore, even if Katzel is not controlling, the logic of the 
Court's decision in Katzel, interpreted in light of modern trade-
mark law, would provide U.S. trademark owners with relief 
against gray-market importers. 
207. In the cited passage, the phrase "it is found by public understanding" is 
contained in a parenthetical. This supports the view that the public perception was not 
the rationale for the holding. To hold, however, that this settled the matter would be 
placing too much emphasis on the placement of two commas more than 60 years ago. 
Roger & Gallet v. Janmarie, 245 F.2d 505, 511 (C.C.P.A. 1957). 
208. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1982); set A. MILLER & M. DAVIS, supra note 49, at 149; 
set also Premier Dental Products Co. v. Darby Dental Supply Co., 794 F.2d 850, 854-
55 (3d Cir. 1986). 
209. This line of cases, called reverse confusion or illusion of sponsorship cases, 
involves a large business (usually the defendant) that adopts a trademark similar to a 
trademark that is already being used by a smaller business (usually the plaintiff). 
Because of the defendant's advertising, the public mistakenly comes to believe that 
plaintiffs product comes from the defendant. E.g. Big 0 Tire Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear 
Tire & Rubber Co., 561 F.2d 1365 (lOth Cir. 1977), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 1052 
(1978). In such a case, there is no confusion as to the origin of the defendant's goods, 
which was the traditional requirement for trademark infringement. See Westward Coach 
Manufacturing Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 388 F.2d 627 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 
927 (1968). In 1962, the Lanham Act was amended and the requirement that the 
confusion relate to the origin of defendant's goods was deleted. This amendment, which 
made any form of confusion actionable, increased the protection granted to a firm's 
goodwill. See J. GILSON, supra note 49, § 5.01; A. MILLER & M. DAVIs, supra note 49, 
§ 13.2. 
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the other remedies they provide, each provision would permit the 
exclusion of goods imported in violation of it. 
Section 526 of the Tariff Act of 1930 
1922-23 was a banner period for opponents of the gray market. 
In addition to the Supreme Court decisions in the two Bourjois 
cases, Congress passed the General Goods Exclusion Act of 1922, 
which was later reenacted as section 526 of the Tariff Act of 1930 
(section 526). 219 The Genuine Goods Exclusion Act made it illegal 
for anyone to "import into the United States any merchandise of 
foreign manufacture if such merchandise ... bears a trademark 
owned by a citizen of, or by . a corporation . . . created or 
organized within the United States . . . unless the written consent 
of the owner is produced at the time of making entry. " 2211 
This statute, which was intended to overrule the decision of 
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Katze/, 221 has been 
at the center of the debate on gray markets. 222 The statute raises 
two important questions. The first question is whether the statute 
protects the goodwill of independent U.S. trademark owners only 
or of all U.S. trademark owners, irrespective of their relationship 
with their foreign manufacturers. 22:1 The second question is, as-
suming that the statute protects the goodwill of all U.S. trademark 
owners, whether Customs' regulations can be upheld as an ex-
ercise of its enforcement discretion. 
Three circuit court cases have dealt directly with the scope of 
section 526 and the validity of Customs' regulations interpreting 
that section. The first case to put Customs' regulations under 
section 526 firmly at issue was Vivitar Corp. v. U.S. and 47th St. 
Photo. 224 Plaintiff, Vivitar, is a U.S. corporation and the owner 
of the VIVITAR trademark in the United States. m Vivitar author-
219. 19 u.s.c. s 1526 (1982). 
220. 19 U.S.C. S 1526(a) (1982). 
221. Osawa, 589 F. Supp. 1163, 1171 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). 
222. Compare COP/AT, 790 F.2d 903, 910-912 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (section 526 intended 
to protect all U.S. companies), with Vivitar Co. v. United States, 593 F. Supp. 420, 426-
428 (Ct. lnt'l Trade 1984) (section 526 only intended to overturn Katzel). 
223. See Viuitar, 593 F. Supp. at 1565-68; Osawa, 589 F. Supp. at 1163. 
224. 593 F. Supp. 420 (1984), ajj'd, 761 F.2d 1552 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 
106 S. Ct. 791 (1986). 
225. Viuitar, 593 F. Supp. 420, 422 (1984). 
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Extending Katzel 
In 1923, the logic of Katzel was extended to section 27 of the 
Trademark Act of 1905 (1905 Act),210 the predecessor of section 
42 of the Lanham Act. 211 Section 27 of the 1905 Act excluded 
from entry into the United States marks that copy or simulate 
registered trademarks. 212 In Bourjois & Co. v. Aldridge,m the same 
plaintiff as in Katzel brought suit against Aldridge, the Collector 
of Customs, in order to exclude French face powder imported 
into the United States bearing the French registered trademark 
PouDRE MANON LESCAUT. 214 The plaintiff argued that the imported 
face powder bore a trademark that copied or simulated the iden-
tical U.S. registered trademark. 215 In response to questions cer-
tified by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit/ 16 the 
U.S. Supreme Court ruled in favor of the plaintiff and directed 
the Collector of Customs to exclude the genuine, but infringing, 
French powder. 217 
The significance of the Supreme Court's decision in Aldridge is 
its holding that under section 27 of the 1905 Act, importation of 
genuine unauthorized trademarked goods produced abroad in-
fringes the U.S. trademark. Thus, Aldridge extended the logic of 
Katzel to the 1905 Act and provided an independent statutory 
ground for excluding gray-market imports. 21 " 
Statutory Provisions 
Congress has enacted four statutory provisions by which the 
importation of gray-market goods may be fought. In addition to 
210. /d. (originally enacted as Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, § 27, 33 Stat. 730). 
211. 15U.S.C. §1124(1982). 
212. See Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1!63, 1171 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) 
(citing A. Bourjois & Co. v. Aldridge, 263 U.S. 675 (1923) (per curiam)). 
213. 263 U.S. 675 (1923) (per curiam). 
214. See Osawa, 589 F. Supp. at 1171. 
215. /d. 
216. The Second Circuit certified the following two questions: 
(I) Is the sale in the United States of Werthermer's Manon Lescaut powder 
an infringement of plaintiff's registered trade-mark? (2) Is the collector, by 
section 27 of the Trade-mark Law, required to exclude from entry genuine 
Manon Lescaut powder so as aforesaid made in France? 
A. Bourjois & Co. v. Aldridge, 292 F. 1013, 1014 (2d Cir. 1922). 
217. /d. 
218. See Osawa, 589 F. Supp. at 1171. 
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ized foreign firms to manufacture photographic equipment with 
the VIVITAR trademark.226 The equipment was then marketed 
outside of the United States by a wholly-owned subsidiary of 
Vivitar. 227 Third parties bought the equipment abroad and im-
ported it into the United States without Vivitar's authorization. 228 
Plaintiff, contending that Customs' regulations were contrary to 
law, sought a declaratory judgment that Customs was required 
to exclude all imports bearing its trademarks that entered without 
its consent. 229 Thus, the central issue in Vivitar was the proper 
construction of section 526. 2:111 Both sides moved for summary 
judgment, and the U.S. Court oflnternational Trade (CIT) found 
in favor of the defendant. 2:11 The CIT based its decision on two 
points: Congress had reviewed Customs' regulations enforcing 
section 526 without altering it, and Customs had maintained a 
consistent interpretation since 1936.m Thus, in view of the leg-
islative and administrative history of section 526, the CIT held 
that Customs' interpretation was sufficiently reasonable. 2:n 
Vivitar appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 
which affirmed the CIT decision but on narrower grounds, spe-
cifically rejecting the grounds upon which the CIT's decision had 
been based.:.m The Federal Circuit found the legislative history 
too unfocused to permit a definitive interpretation of congressional 
intent. m It also found there to be no long-standing, consistent 
interpretation by Customs of section 526/11; Instead, the Federal 
Circuit found a history of changing interpretations. m Finally, the 
court found Congress too unfamiliar with Customs' enforcement 
of section 526 to infer that Congress had ratified Customs' reg-
ulations. nH 
226. /d. 
227. /d. 
228. /d. at 422-423. 
229. /d. at 422. 
230. /d. at 425. 
231. /d. at 423, 436. 
232. /d. at 425-26. 
233. /d. at 433-34. 
234. Vivitar, 761 F.2d 1552 (1985). 
235. /d. at 1563-65. 
236. /d. at 1565-68. 
237. /d. 
238. /d. at 1568. 
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The Federal Circuit did not hold Customs' regulations to be 
invalid; rather, it held the current regulations to be valid but not 
controlling with respect to the scope of protection of section 
526(a). 23!1 The court held that Customs' regulations merely define 
Customs' role in initiating administrative enforcement. 24° Customs 
is not required to exclude all gray-market goods sua sponte. 241 
Because section 526(c) provides U.S. trademark owners with a 
private right of action,242 they can go to district court to have 
their rights under section 526 adjudicated on a case-by-case ba-
sis. 24:1 
The only case to strike down completely Customs' regulations 
was brought in the District Court for the District of Columbia 
by the Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks 
(COPIAT) against the United States. Two retailers that deal in 
gray-market merchandise, K-mart and 47th St. Photo, intervened. 
In COP/AT v. United States, 244 plaintiff brought an action alleging 
that Customs' regulations under section 526 are inconsistent with 
the 1930 Act and the Lanham Act. 245 Plaintiff sought a declaratory 
judgment that Customs' regulations are inconsistent with section 
526, an injunction prohibiting enforcement of these regulations, 
and an order directing that the statute be enforced. Hfi The district 
court found the regulations to be sufficiently reasonable. 247 
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, 
per Judge Silberman, held that the regulations were inconsistent 
with the statute they implemented. 248 The court found that the 
language of section 526 was clear, and thus, there was no room 
for a different interpretation by Customs;H!I hence, the court held 
that the regulations were invalid as an unreasonable interpretation 
of the statute. 2''11 The D.C. Circuit explicitly rejected the Federal 
239. /d. at 1570. 
240. /d. at 1569. 
241. /d. 
242. 19 U.S.C. § 1526(c) (1982). See supra note 14 for statutory language of section 
526(c). 
243. Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1570. 
244. 598 F. Supp. 844 (D.D.C. 1984). 
245. /d. at 845. 
246. /d. 
247. /d. at 852-53. 
248. COP/AT, 790 F.2d 903. 
249. /d. at 908-13. 
250. /d. at 908-16. 
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guided by Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc. / 1;11 where the Supreme Court stated: 
When a court reviews an agency's construction of the 
statute which it administers, it is confronted with two 
questions. First, always, is the question whether Congress 
has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the 
intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; 
for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to 
the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, how-
ever, the court determines Congress has not directly ad-
dressed the precise question at issue, the court does not 
simply impose its own construction of the statute, as would 
be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpre-
tation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with 
respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is 
whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible 
construction of the statute. 
'The power of an administrative agency to administer a 
congressionally created . . . program necessarily requires 
the formulation of policy and the making of rules to fill 
any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress.' Morton 
v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974). If Congress has explic-
itly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express 
delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific 
provision of the statute by regulation. Such legislative 
regulations are given controlling weight unless they are 
arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute. 
Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on a 
particular question is implicit rather than explicit. In such 
a case, a court may not substitute its own construction of 
a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made 
by the administrator of an agency. 1h 1 
Section 526 leaves no gap to be filled, and Customs' interpreta-
tion that the statute only applies when there is an independent 
260. 467 u.s. 837 (1984) .. 
261. /d. at 842-44 (footnotes omitted). 
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Circuit's conclusion that the regulations were a legitimate means 
of defining Customs' role in initiating enforcement because Cus-
toms has always viewed the regulations as its interpretation of the 
; la'w, not as an expression of its discretion to prosecute less than 
to"-the full extent of the law.l'•' 
MQ,_st recently, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in 
OlympUs Corp. v. United States, has followed the path of the Federal 
Circuit, by upholding Customs' regulations while permitting U.S. 
trademark holders to pursue private remedies. 252 Olympus is the 
U.S. subsidiary of the Japanese corporation that manufactures 
OLYMPUS brand cameras and accessories.l":1 Having failed to get 
Customs to change its administrative practice, Olympus brought 
suit seeking a declaration that the Customs' regulations are in-
valid.m The Second Circuit held that there had been congressional 
acquiescence in Customs' longstanding administrative interpre-
tation. m The Second Circuit also held that Customs' interpre-
tation of section 526 avoided the making of a decision at the time 
the goods are imported as to whether the trademark holder was 
engaging in price discrimination.l"b Judge Winter's dissent re-
jected the administrative convenience argument because that ar-
gument is premised on the idea that not all gray-market goods 
are excluded by section 526.m 
What these cases suggest is that the validity of Customs' reg-
ulations is a question of administrative law as much as a question 
of tariff or trademark law. 
There are several problems with the position that section 526 
was enacted to protect independent U.S. trademark owners only.l'•" 
First, the language of the statute is clear. All trademarked mer-
chandise is to be excluded unless the U.S. trademark owner has 
given his consent. In deciding what deference to give Customs' 
interpretation of section 526, the D.C. Circuit in COPIATm was 
251. /d. at 918. 
252. Olympus Corp. v. United States, 792 F.2d 315 (2d Cir. 1986). 
253. /d. at 317. 
254. /d. at 316. 
255. /d. at 320. 
256. /d. 
257. /d. at 322 (Winter, J., dissenting). 
258. The three circuit courts that have considered the issue have all held that section 
526 was enacted to do more than just reverse the Second Circuit's decision in Katzel. 
Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1565; COP/AT, 790 F.2d at 912; Olympus, 792 F.2d at :H9. 
259. 790 F.2d at 908. 
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U.S. trademark owner is in direct conflict with the statute. 262 
An examination of the legislative history of section 526 reveals 
no clear indication that Congress intended section 526 to be 
limited to. the facts in Katzel. The Senate debate on section 526 
was short but vigorous. ~li:l Certainly some of the opponents of the 
bill thought it would cover a wide range of imports. Senator 
Kellogg declared that it applied to everything/M and Senator 
Lenraut thought the amendment would apply to related as well 
as unrelated trademark owners. 'lfi:• The proponents of the bill stated 
on two occasions that the bill would only apply when the trade-
mark had been sold to a U.S. citizen or business, ~til) yet they did 
not say that any such U.S. business would have to be independent 
of the foreign trademark owner. 'lli7 Moreover, the Senate was 
mistaken about the facts in Katzel. The Senate that passed the 
General Goods Exclusion Act of 1922 was of the opinion that the 
French trademark owner in Katzel sold the trademarked mer-
chandise in the United States;'lliH it did not know that independent 
262. In a recent case involving a Federal Reserve Board regulation defining banks, 
the Supreme Court held that the Board acted without authority in defining banks more 
broadly than their statutory definition. In striking down the regulation, which would 
have expanded the Board's authority beyond that granted b)' Congress, the Court made 
the following statement: 
In determining whether the Board was empowered to make such a change, 
we begin, of course, with the language of the statute. If the statute is clear 
and unambiguous "that is the end of the matter, for the court, as well as the 
agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.'' 
The traditional deference courts pay to agency interpretation is not to be 
applied to alter the clearly expressed intent of Congress. 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System v. Dimension Financial Corp., 106 
S. Ct. 681, 686 (1986) (footnote omitted). 
263. It only runs four pages from 62 CoNG. REc. Sll ,602 to S11,605. 
264. 62 CoNG. REc. S11,603 (daily ed. Aug. 19, 1922) (statements of Sen. Kellogg). 
265. /d. at S11,605 (statement of Sen. Lenroot); see COP/AT, 790 F.2d 903, 911-
912 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
266. 62 CoNe. REc. Sll,603, Sll ,605. 
267. After declaring that the bill would only protect citizens who purchased the U.S. 
trademark, Senator Sutherland responded to a hypothetical posed by Senator Lenroot 
claiming that the bill would prevent an American from going to Toronto, buying, and 
then importing into the United States goods manufactured in the United States. 62 
CoNG. REc. Sl1,603 (daily ed. Aug. 19, 1922) (statements of Sen. Sutherland and 
Sen. Lenroot). This answer indicates a broader scope for the bill than the Katzel 
situation. 
268. 62 CoNG. REc. S11,603, S11 ,604 (daily ed. Aug. 19, 1922) (statements of Sen. 
Sutherland and Sen. McCumber). 
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importers purchased the powder in France and imported 1t mto 
the United States. Because the Senate was mistaken about the 
Katzel fads, it would be difficult to limit section 526 to the actual 
facts in Katzel. Moreover, there are a number of references that 
suggest the provision is aimed at fraud. 269 A U.S. trademark 
owner is not defrauded by a foreign trademark owner just because 
he has purchased the U.S. rights; the foreign trademark owner 
commits fraud only when, after selling the exclusive U.S. rights 
to another, it tries to compete. Thus, it is difficult to reach any 
conclusions from the Senate debate on the scope of the legisla-
tion.270 
In addition to the clear language of the statute,271 the strongest 
argument against reading any implied limitations into the statute 
is that the Senate amended the bill so that it only covered 
merchandise of foreign manufacture, and the House amended the 
bill so that only U.S. entities, and not merely domiciliaries, were 
protected. If Congress really thought the bill applied only to 
independent U.S. firms that had purchased the exclusive U.S. 
rights from the foreign manufacturer, neither amendment would 
have been necessary. 272 Therefore, section 526 cannot properly be 
interpreted to exclude gray-market imports only when there is an 
independent U.S. trademark owner. 
Proponents of the gray market have frequently argued that 
Customs' regulations reflect a consistent, long-standing interpre-
tation of the statute and are entitled to substantial deference. m 
Putting aside the rule that an agency's interpretation of a statute 
cannot be upheld in the face of clear and contrary statutory 
language, 274 an examination of more than sixty years of admin-
istrative practice reveals a history of changing interpretations. The 
first set of regulations, issued in 1931, was quite broad and 
prohibited the entry of "imported merchandise bearing a genuine 
trademark when such trademark is recorded with the Treasury 
269. /d. 
270. See COP/AT, 790 F.2d at 913-18; Vivitar Co. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552, 
1553 (Fed. Cir. 1985). But see Vivitar, 593 F. Supp. 420, 426-28 (Ct. lnt'l Trade 1984). 
271. Kenneth Dam, who argued that section 526 permits trademark owners to engag'e 
in monopolistic price discrimination, conceded that the plain meaning of the statute 
was probably controlling. Dam, supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
272. Set COP/AT, 790 F.2d at 912. 
273. Set, e.g., id. at 913-14; Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1565. 
274. See supra note 262. 
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Department and registered under the trademark law of February 
20, 1905 if compliance is had with all provisions of section 526 
of the Tariff Act of 1930." 275 In 1936, Customs issued a new 
series of regulations that significantly limited the scope of section 
526.276 The new regulations still prevented foreign goods bearing 
an identical U.S. trademark from entering the United States 
without the U.S. trademark owner's consent. The new regula-
tions, however, denied this protection against imports from a 
foreign entity if the foreign trademark and U.S. trademark were 
owned by the same entity.277 In 1953, Customs further reduced 
the protection afforded by section 526 when it issued regulations 
that would not bar unauthorized imports when the foreign trade-
mark was owned by a "related company" of the U.S. trademark 
owner; the definition of related company was broad enough to 
include licensees.278 In practice, however, the regulation was not 
enforced and section 526 was enforced without exception.m In 
1959, Customs changed its regulations again; the "related com-
pany" exception was out, replaced by a "same entity" exception. 
The 1959 regulations, however, did not require disclosure, so 
they could not be fully enforced. 2110 In 1972, Customs adopted its 
present regulations, which contain exceptions for common own-
ership and license agreements, and which require disclosure of 
these relationships. 2111 
That Customs has not maintained a consistent, long-standing 
interpretation of the statute2112 is also evident from the Guerlain 
275. Vivitar, 593 F. Supp. at 428-29 (quoting Customs' Regulations of 1931, art. 
5!8(a)). 
276. /d. at 429; Speech of David Elliot, Grey Market Goods-The Law and the 
Grey Market-Which Court Has The Current View? What Does the Future Hold?, 
Third Annual Judicial Conference of the Court of International Trade in New York 
City (Oct. 24, 1986). 
277. Set Vivitar, 593 F. Supp. at 428-32. 
278. See Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1566. 
279. Speech of David Elliot, Grey Market Goods-The Law and the Grey Market-
Which Court Has The Current View? What Does the Future Hold? Third Annual 
Judicial Conference of the Court of International Trade in New York City (Oct. 24, 
1986); Note, The Greying of Ameri€an Trademark£; The Genuine Goods Exclusion Act and the 
ln€ongruity of Customs Regulation 19 C.F.R. 133.21, 54 FoRDHAM L. REv. 83, 98-101 
(1985). 
280. See Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1566. 
281. /d. at 1567. 
282. Detailed disc~ssions of the history of Customs' administrative practices are 
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and Bell & Howell: Mamiya Co. v. Masel Supply Co. cases. Guerlain 
involved three U.S. trademark owners that had used section 526 
to exclude genuine goods. 21n The three U.S. firms were all related 
to the French manufacturers. 2H4 The district court found a violation 
of the Sherman Act. 2H'' On appeal, the Solicitor General indicated 
that the United States wanted to abandon the suit because, while 
the Justice Department considered section 526 unavailable to U.S. 
subsidiaries of foreign trademark owners, Customs considered 
itself bound to enforce section 526 literally. 2H6 Just three years 
ago, in Bell & Howell: Mamiya, the Chief Counsel of the Customs 
Service signed an amicus brief filed by the Department of Justice, 
arguing that the plain meaning of section 526 is controlling. 2H7 
The brief argues that only the clearest showing of contrary 
congressional intent could justify a different interpretation, and 
that there is no clear evidence of such intent. 2HH Thus, Customs' 
contained in Vivitar, 593 F. Supp. at 428-33, 776 F.2d at 1565-68; Note, supra note 
279, at 98-101. The courts have reached opposite conclusions. The CIT concluded that 
Customs has been consistent, 593 F. Supp. at 432, and the CAFC concluded that it 
has not been consistent, 776 F.2d at 1568. 
283. United States v. Guerlain, Inc., 155 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), vacated and 
mnanded, 358 U.S. 915 (1958), dismissed with prejudice, 172- F. Supp. 107 (S.D.N.Y. 
1959). 
284. /d. 
285. /d. 
286. See Vivitar Co. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552, 1566-1567 (Fed. Cir. 1985); 
COP/AT, 790 F.2d 903, 915 (D.C.Cir. 1986). 
287. See Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1568; Duracell, supra note 3, at 2-3 (additional views of 
Vice Chairman Liebeler). 
288. The amicus brief argues that U.S. trademark owners have the legal right to 
exclude gray-market imports: 
208 
[T)he plain meaning of the words Congress has selected is ordinarily conclusive 
of the scope of a statute, absent the clear expression of a contrary intent by 
Congress . . . . Here, nothing in the language of U 32 or 42 of the Lanham 
Act or in the language of § 526 of the 1930 Tariff Act, 19 U.S.C. 1526, 
which affords additional remedies to U.S. trademark holders, expressly limits 
the exclusionary rights conferred to U.S. firms that are independent of owners 
of identical foreign marks. Rather, the relevant language in all three statutory 
provisions purports to confer the exclusionary rights awarded to all owners of 
U.S. trademarks who satisfy the other requirements of the provisions. Since 
the statutory language contains no ambiguity on this point, only the clearest 
expression of a contrary intent in the legislative history would warrant de-
parting from the normal meaning of the language employed by Congress 
.... But neither the legislative reports nor the congressional debate contain 
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interpretation of section 526-that it does not cover trademarked 
imports when the U.S. and foreign trademark owners are related 
in certain ways-is at least fourteen years younger than the statute 
and has been inconsistent since then. ~119 
Most of the litigation and debate involving section 526 now 
revolves around the validity of Customs' regulations promulgated 
under subsection d, :.wo as seen in the division among the circuit 
courts on the question whether Customs' regulations are valid. ~!11 
Two circuit courts have held that Customs' regulations are a 
legitimate exercise of Customs' discretion in enforcing section 
526, but do not define the limits of section 526. 292 The statute, 
however, does not grant Customs the discretion not to exclude 
any trademarked merchandise covered by section 526(a). Thus, 
to permit Customs to refuse to exclude gray-market goods as an 
act of agency discretion is to allow it to engage in a pattern of 
nonenforcement of clear statutory language. ~!n Moreover, the ad-
ministrative convenience argument-that Customs can avoid de-
termining whether the U.S. trademark owner is engaging in 
anticompetitive behavior-294presumes section 526 does not ex-
clude all gray-market goods of foreign manufacture.~!15 Therefore, 
any clear evidence of a legislative intent to deny trademark protection where 
the owner of the U.S. mark is owned or controlled by the foreign manufacturer 
of the trademarked goods. 
Brief for the United States of Americl!., Amicus Curiae, at 5, Bell & Howell: Mamiya 
Co. v. Masel Supply Co., 719 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1983) (footnotes omitted); see also 
Duracel/, supra note 3, l!.t 3 (additional views of Vice Chairman Liebeler). 
289. The inconsistency of Customs' interpretation of section 526 over the years 
weakens any argument that Congress has ratified or acquiesced in a particular inter-
pretation. Moreover, although Congress was aware, albeit incorrectly, of Customs' 
interpretation in 1978 when it amended section 526 to exempt returning travelers, there 
is no evidence that Congress approved of Customs' practice. It does not follow that 
Congress acquiesced in Customs' interpretation of one part of the statute because it 
decided to change another. &e COP/AT, 790 F.2d at 917; Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1568. 
But see Vivitar, 593 F. Supp. at 432-33; see also Speech of David Elliot, supra note 276. 
290. The regulations promulgated under 19 U.S.C. S 1526(d) (1982) are published 
at 19 C.F.R. S 133.21 (1985) and are reprinted in !frtinent part in footnote 15, supra. 
291. &e Vivitar, 593 F. Supp. at 428-31 (quotin~ customs regulations promulgated 
pursuant to subsection (d) of the Tariff Act of 193Dp. 
292. Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1569-70; Olympus, 792 F.2d at 320. But see COP/AT, 790 
F.2d at 918. 
293. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 839 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
294. Olympus, 792 F.2d at 320; Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1569-70. 
295. &e Olympus, 792 F.2d at 320 (Winker, J., dissenting). 
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Customs' regulations under section 526(d) should not be upheld 
as an exen;:ise of its enforcement discretion. 
Section 4 2 of the Lanham Act 
The second statutory provision that has been used to exclude 
gray-market goods from the United States is section 42 of the 
Lanham Act. ~96 Section 42 of the Lanham Act reads in pertinent 
part: 
Except as provided in [Treasury regulations under section 526], no 
article or imported merchandise which shall copy or simulate 
the name of any domestic manufacturer, or trader, or of 
any manufacturer or trader located in any foreign country 
which, by treaty, convention, or law affords similar priv-
ileges to citizens of the United States, or which shall copy 
or simulate a trademark registered in accordance with the pro-
visions of this chapter . . . shall be admitted to entry at any 
customhouse of the United States. 2!17 
The ability of section 42 to provide relief against unauthorized 
imports is limited by Customs' regulations interpreting section 
526 and the language "copy or simulate a [registered] trade-
mark. "<!!IB The issue is whether the unauthorized trademarks af-
fixed to genuine merchandise imported into the United States 
copy or simulate a trademark, within the provisions of the statute. 
In most cases, the trademarks are similar, if not identical. Thus, 
the only questions would appear to be whether the foreign goods 
are insulated by virtue of their being genuine, and, if they are 
not, what must be proven to show that the mark is a copy or 
simulation of the registered trademark. Katzel and Aldridge, which 
held that genuine goods can infringe the identical U.S. trademark, 
clearly show that genuine goods are not exempt. 2!1~ 1 
Unlike section 32(1) of the Lanham Act, which defines trade-
mark infringement,:l!KI section 42 does not require consumer con-
296. 15 U.S.C. S 1124 (1982). 
297. /d. (emphasis added). 
298. See supra notes 219-287 and accompanying text. 
299. See supra notes 185-194 and 204-218 and accompanying text. 
300. Section 32(1) provides that the use of a copy of a registered trademark is only 
actionable if there is confusion. 15 U.S.C. S 1114 (1982). See supra notes 174-184 and 
accompanying text. 
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fusion, only that there be a copy or simulation. Moreover, it is 
difficult to see how the relationship between the domestic and 
foreign trademark owner would be relevant under section 42.:1111 
Aldridge held that face powder produced by the French trademark 
owner in France for sale in France bears a trademark that is a 
copy or simulation of the U.S. trademark when the U.S. trade-
mark is owned by a company that is independent of the French 
trademark owner. :102 If the U.S. trademark owner were related to 
the French trademark owner, the gray-market powder would still 
be genuine and would still enter the U.S. market ouside of the 
control of the U.S. trademark owner. In both cases, the U.S. 
trademark owner would obtain his powder from the French man-
ufacturer and would promote it in the United States. In both 
cases, the gray-market powder would be produced by the French 
manufacturer and it would be imported and sold by someone 
other than the U.S. trademark owner. From the perspective of 
the U.S. trademark owner, the situation would be the same.:111:1 
Therefore, assuming the U.S. trademark is registered, then any 
gray-market import bearing that trademark bears a trademark 
that copies or simul,ates a U.S. registered trademark. 
Section 43 of the Lanham Acfm4 
I 
A third statutory provision that could serve as a basis for 
excluding gray-market imports is section 43 of the Lanham Act,305 
which is generally recognized as incorporating the common law 
of unfair competition into federal statutory law .:uu; Section 43(b) 
301. See Olympus, 627 FJ Supp. at 321. The court heard this argument but rejected 
it because it placed too much emphasis on a one-sentence, per curiam opinion that may 
have been influenced by the equities of the case. /d. 
302. This holding was implicit. The circuit court asked if the powder infringed the 
U.S. trademark; a mark must be a copy or simulation in order for it to infringe a 
trademark. 
303. When a U.S. trademark owner is related to a foreign trademark owner and 
gray-market impons do not copy the U.S. trademark, they cannot infringe the U.S. 
mark even if there is confusion; one of the statutory elements of infringement is that 
there be a copy of a registered mark. 15 U.S.C. § ll14(1)(a) (1982). 
304. 15 u.s.c. § 1125 (1982). 
305. The text of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982), can 
be found in footnote 155, supra; su also supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
306. See J. GILSON, supra note 49, § 7.02; A. MILLER & M. DAVIS, supra note 49, 
at 250. 
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prohibits the importation of goods that are marked in violation 
of section 43( a). :1117 Gray-market goods that are not adequately 
labeled as being imported and sold outside of the manufacturer's 
chain of distribution falsely represent the party that authorizes 
the goods. Thus, gray-market goods could violate the language 
of section 43(a) because they falsely suggest that they come from 
the U.S. trademark owner.:ma Although unlabeled gray-market 
goods would be covered by section 43(a), labeled gray-market 
goods that merely take a free ride on investments by domestic 
trademark owners would not be covered. For if the gray-market 
goods were properly labeled so that consumers knew precisely 
what they were receiving, there would be no false representa-
tion.:11" 
Section 337 of the Tariff Act of J930lln 
There is a fourth statute that can serve as a basis for excluding 
gray-market merchandise: section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 
which is administered by the U.S. International Trade Commis-
sion (lTC). m 
Section 337 proscribes unfair methods of competition (in the 
importation or sale of merchandise) that have the effect or tend-
ency to destroy or injure substantially an industry efficiently and 
economically operated in the United States.m If the lTC finds a 
307. Section 43(b) reads in pertinent part: "[A)ny goods marked or labeled in 
contravention of the provisions of this section shall not be imported into the United 
States or admitted to entry at any customhouse of the United States." 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1125(b) (1982). 
308. See infra notes 310-336 and accompanying text. 
309. This is not to say that properly labeled gray-market goods can prevent all 
confusion. A consumer who purchases a defective DuRACELL battery that is clearly 
labeled as imported and sold outside the authorized chain of distribution may not know 
whether the battery is defective because of improper handling by the importer or poor 
quality control by Duracell. See supra note 184 and accompanying text. Although the 
purchaser of a properly labeled gray-market import can suffer trademark confusion, he 
would still have no claim under section 43(a) because there would be no false rcpre-
sentation. 
310. 19 u.s.c. § 1337 (1982). 
311. /d. For a discussion of the Commission's proceedings under section 337, see 
Palmeter, The U.S. lnterrw.tional Trade Commission at Common Law, 18 J. WoRLD TRADE 
L. 497 (1984). 
312. Section 337 of the Tariff Act reads in operative part as follows: 
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violation of section 337, it must grant an order excluding the 
offending merchandise from entering the United States, unless 
considerations of public interest indicate that a different remedy 
or no remedy would be appropriate. :m Once the lTC has made 
its determination, it must communicate this determination to the 
President, who ·may then disapprove the ITC's determination for 
policy reasons.m If the President disapproves the ITC's deter-
mination, the determination is without legal force or effect. :n:. 
Certain Alkaline Batteries (Duracell) is the first gray-market case to 
be brought under section 337.:~ 11; The complainant, Duracell, is 
the owner of the U.S. registered trademark DuRACELL, which it 
uses on alkaline batteries it manufactures in the United States.m 
The identical trademark, registered in Belgium, is owned by 
Duracell International, a subsidiary of Duracell.m Duracell au-
thorized Duracell-Belgium, a subsidiary of Duracell International, 
to manufacture DuRACELL batteries and affix the Belgian trade-
mark.:ll!l Duracell-Belgium was not authorized to sell batteries in 
Unfair methods of competition and unfair acts in the importation of articles 
into the United States, or in their sale by the owner, importer, consignee, or 
agent of either, the effect or tendency of which is to destroy or substantially 
injure an industry, efficiently and economically operated in the United States, 
or to prevent the establishment of such an industry, or to restrain or monop-
olize trade and commerce in the United States, are declared unlawful, and 
when found by the Commission to exist shall be dealt with, in addition to 
any other provision of the law, as provided in this section. 
19 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (1982). 
313. Section 1337(d) reads in pertinent part as follows: 
If the Commission determines, as a result of an investigation under this 
section, that there is a violation of this section, it shall direct that the articles 
concerned, imported by any person violating the provision of this section, be 
excluded from entry into the United States, unless, after considering the effect 
of such exclusion upon the public health and welfare, competitive conditions 
in the United States economy, the production of like or directly competitive 
articles in the United States, and United States consumers, it finds that such 
articles should not be excluded from entry. 
19 u.s.c. § 1337(d) (1982). 
314. 19 u.s.c. § 1337(g) (1982). 
315. /d. 
316. Supra note 3. 
317. Duracell, supra note 3, at 4-5. 
318. /d. 
319. /d. at 5. 
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the United States.:120 Importers, such as the respondents, would 
purchase DURACELL batteries on the open market in Europe after 
they had left the control of Duracell-Belgium, import them into 
the United States, and sell them to retailers for sale in the U.S. 
market. m 
The lTC unanimously held that gray-market DuRACELL bat-
teries violated section 337 .:m The lTC found a violation of section 
337 on six grounds: (1) common law trademark infringement,:m 
(2) trademark infringement under the Lanham Act,:m (3) violation 
of section 42 of the Lanham Act,m (4) misappropriation of trade 
dress,:126 (5) false designation of origin,:m and (6) violation of the 
Fair Packaging and Labeling Act.n8 The lTC determined that 
an order excluding the unauthorized batteries was the appropriate 
remedy because only an exclusion order could protect Duracell 's 
goodwill in the United States.m 
The efficacy of section 337 as an instrument to prevent gray-
market imports is currently in doubt. On January 4, 1985, Pres-
ident Reagan informed the lTC of his decision to disapprove its 
determination in this case.:no The President gave two reasons for 
his disapproval. First, the Commission's interpretation of section 
42 of the Lanham Act was at odds with Treasury's interpreta-
tion.:~:~~ Second, because the Cabinet Council on Commerce and 
Trade was studying the problem, a failure to disapprove the 
320. /d. 
321. /d. at 5-6. 
322. /d. at 1. 
323. /d. at 6-20. 
324. /d. at 23-33. 
325. /d. at 20-23. 
326. /d. at 33. 
327. /d. at 33-34. 
328. /d. at 34-35. 
329. /d. at 39. The minority recommended a narrow exclusion order drawn against 
batteries that violated the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act, which requires labels in 
English. The minority also recommended labeling, arguing that it would prevent 
consumer confusion. /d. at 33-39 (views of Chairwoman Stern and Commissioner 
Rohr). The majority, however, thought that because of the strength of the mark and 
the low value of the product, consumers probably would not read the labels. /d. at 3.7-
41. 
330. Determination of the President Regarding Certain Alkaline Batteries, 50 Fed. 
Reg. 1655 (1985). 
331. /d. 
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determination could be viewed as a change in the current policy 
before the process was complete.:m Although the President's dis-
approval of the ITC's decision in Duracell raises a practical ques-
tion of whether section 337 will be used to prevent gray-market 
imports,n:l there is no question that section 337 is quite broad, 
since it refers to "unfair methods of competition and unfair acts 
in the importation of articles. ":m The Court of Customs and 
Patent Appeals (CCPA), which was the ITC's reviewing court,:m 
has held that the language of section 337 cannot be limited to the 
technical definition of unfair methods of competition, and that 
the lTC has been given a wide grant of discretion in determining 
what practices are unfair.:~:~6 Even at best, however, section 337 
would be an imperfect solution to the gray-market problem. The 
virtue of section 337 is that the remedy is to exclude the offending 
merchandise. The weakness of section 337 is that the U.S. trade-
mark owner may not be able to obtain that remedy until it has 
already been damaged, perhaps severely, by gray-market mer-
chandise. 
CoNcLUSION 
Gray-market goods take a free ride on the investments made 
by U.S. trademark owners and reduce the returns to manufac-
turers and trademark owners from providing high-quality goods 
and promoting them. In the long run, this will lead to fewer 
brands, lower-quality merchandise, fewer services and less infor-
mation. Prohibiting U.S. trademark owners from excluding gray-
market goods will also inhibit the introduction of foreign products 
into the United States and the introduction of U.S. products 
332. /d. 
333. Since the President's disapproval in Duracell, only one complaint involving gray-
market imports has been filed with the Commission. This one case, involving "Cabbage 
Patch Kids" dolls, relied on a claim of copyright infringment and did not include any 
trademark claims. On November 7, 1986 the Commission voted to issue a general 
exclusion order; the period for presidential review expires 60 days later. Certain Soft 
Sculpture Dolls, Popularly Known as "Cabbage Patch Kids," Related Literature and 
Packaging Therefor, lnv. No. 337-TA-231, USITC Pub. 1923 (1986). 
334. See supra note 300. 
335. The Court of Appeals of the Federal Circuit (CAFC) is the successor to the 
CCPC following the 1982 reorganization, and is now the Commission's reviewing court. 
See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1295 (1982). 
336. In re Von Clem, 229 F.2d 441, 444 (C.C.P.A. 1955). 
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abroad. Moreover, a government-enforced ban on gray-market 
imports is the only effective remedy against gray-market imports. 
Therefore, U.S. trademark owners should have the right to ex-
clude gray-market imports from the United States. 
In contrast, the current policy of the United States toward gray-
market imports is illogical: gray-market goods can enter the 
United States without the U.S. trademark owner's permission 
only if the U.S. and foreign trademark owners are related. The 
folly of this approach is that the relationship between the U.S. 
and foreign trademark owners is independent of the cause of the 
gray-market goods. 
Antitrust, trademark and administrative law principles also sup-
port granting U.S. trademark owners the right to exclude gray-
market imports. Recognizing the right of U.S. trademark owners 
to exclude unauthorized imports would be consistent with modern 
antitrust principles because the U.S. trademark owner that ex-
cludes gray-market imports is essentially enforcing a nonprice, 
vertical restraint, which is almost always procompetitive, and 
which is only illegal if it is anticompetitive. Such a policy would 
also be consistent with modem trademark law principles, which 
recognize the rights of U.S. trademark owners to the returns 
generated by the goodwill they have created. Finally, such a 
policy would implement section 42 of the Lanham Act and section 
526 of the Tariff Act of 1930, both of which by their language 
would exclude unauthorized imports. 
216 [Vol. 18:145 
